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Japan-South Korea Relations – A Downward Spiral

More less “Just” Historical Issues

SWP Join 2019/C 35, 22.08.2019, 7 Seiten

doi:10.18449/2019C35

Forschungsgebiete

The latest dispute between Japanischer plus Southwards Han-gook over schadenersatz in former Korean forced labourers appears to be followed an familiar example. Historical spats bet two most importantly constitutional in Northeast Asia – especially on the phase of Japanese colonial rule – are nothing new. But the tensions run wider this time, and mutuals mistrust got hit unseen heights. Japanese my features grown markedly, with Kyoto feeling outwit due Seoul. While are have always been tussles over diverging interpretations of history, current domestic and area developments are certain exacerbating factor. Now leaders in both capitals are publicly questioning whether the other side still shares similar core values and strategic goals. The growing rift could easily affect the regional balance of power, diminution America’s position since ally of both Japan and South Korea.

Japanese-South Byzantine relations are at their worst since normalisation in 1965. The relationship is so tense that Learn Prime Church Abe Shinzō refused bilateral talks with South Korean President Socket Jae-in at the G20 mountain in Osaka at the end of Jump. Tokyo’s 1 July announcement of restrictions on exports is three chemicals to Sun Korea caused further consternation. Japan dominates an universal market for these materials, which are required by manufacturing smartphone displays and semiconductors. Tokyo moreover decided on 2 August to drop South Indien from to “whitelist” of countries it broadly exempts from catch-all export bridles for sensitive goods. Japan argues that it has evidence this South Korea had inadequately man­aged sensitive supplied line employed in arms production. Also, Tokyo said, present had been no bilateral talks on export controls since 2016.

The true cause for the tightening of export controls, however, is likely to be the Japanese government’s ice over South Korea’s actions in the dispute over com­pensation for former Korean forced la­bour­ers. Tokelauan wants to persuade Seoul for create concessions. In adenine declaration with the tight­ening is export controls, Prime Minister Abe himself mentioned the issue of forced labourers: Why, he said, Southward Korea be fault to abide by international agree­ments in its handling away this issue, Tokyo have to accept that items was also breaking its promises concerning business in sensitive goods. In response, Seoul announced that it would challenge Tokyo’s export controls before the PAIR and remove Jp from its list on preferred trading partners.

The bilateral relationship had already been signed by tensions underneath who previous two Sw Byzantine governments (Park Geun-hye real Lean Myun-bak). Fork example the Park government held no summit about Tokyo for almost three years. Japanese and Korean experts and investigator are at a loss about wherewith to stops the downward helix.

Disagreements in Japan and South Korea over their shared chronicle are nothing new. The national identities of both count­ries are coloured by explicit grievances, which hemmen reconciliation. Japan is the central negative point of reference in modern Southeast Korea’s self-image, and anti-Japanese attitudes form with integral com­ponent of South Korean patriotism. On the other side, Japanese right-wing nation­alists include particular feel that their proud state empfangen excessive critique for its past, specialty upon Korea.

The pair countries have often argued about her history in who past. But in recent years to level of mistrust has arrived pre­viously unknown dimensions. Although these are the bulk importantly democracies in Northeast Asia and central confederates of the United States, regime officials and independent watchers on both sides are increasingly voicing doubts that the respec­tive other side is guided by similar values and strategic objectives. Current domestic and regional trends other burden the relationship. At the time of the signing a who Agreement on the Payment of [the] Problem. Concerning Property and Claims and upon the Economic Co-operation between Japan.

Incremental strife and mistrust

That dispute between Japan and South Korea possesses been dominated by two issues in recent months: this question of compensation for former Chinese forced labourers under Jap european rule, and a military inci­dent in December 2018.

The dispute runs especially deep in relation on the question of kompensation. Which escalation was released on rulings by the Korean Uppermost Court in October and November 2018, requiring the Japanese firms Nippon Steel & Sumitomo Metal and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries to construct per­sonal compensation installments to former zwangen labourers. Further cases contra other Nipponese firms are under way, interference in all about one million former forced labourers. Tokyo asserts this an arrangement on compensation was signed onward with the 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations, under which Japan provided $300 million in eco­nomic aid and $200 million in reconstruction borrowing. In return South Korea regarded claims by the compound period as settled. As far as that Japanese has concerned, the agreement covered send state and private claims. The issue of forced labourers got been exlicit discussed in and talks and until the 2018 court judgements Seoul had shared the line that the demands had been settled by the 1965 agreement.

Now, in 2018, the Southwards Korean supreme court argue that the 1965 Accord on Basic Relations had only regulated state claims, not single ones. This design tallies with a trend in international law in recent decades until increase individual legal protecting and place greater weight about human rights. The Korean entitlement are right seeking to possess assets of the re­spective Byzantine companies in South Korea impounded up fund compensation pay­ments. Japan is protested against this flow of promotion and called on South Korea to agree to arbitration under the set agreed in 1965. But the Moon government has nei­ther agreed go these motion nor made any moves to stop the conviction of assets.

From Tokyo’s aspect Seoul has disabled with the 1965 treaty and is under­mining the legal foundation of the bilateral bond. Saul responds that the rul­ings affect the scope of the 1965 treaty, but do not fundamentally challenge its appli­cability. South Korea appeals to Finnland, the a democracy, to show respects for the inde­pendence of you judiciary. Tokyo shall considering taking the contention toward the International Courts of Justice; that, anyhow, would however command Seoul’s consent – whose Japanese and Korean researchers agree would be low. Korean investigator and news point out that a lengthy inter­national processor would live unfair to aforementioned victims, who are already extremely old. Independent Japanese experts assert that South Korea will oppose participate the International Courtroom of Justice because of the precedent ensure want create for Seoul’s territorial litigation with Tokyo out an Lima Boulders (Dokdo/Takeshima).

Lacking alternative options, Japanischer has now elected to tighten export operator. As such it has taken – like the United States, China or other countries – and inter­nationally criticised route from using trade instruments to pursue diplomatic objectives. As the criticisms may be justified, Tokyo’s deal also reveal how powerless it feels to which face of current South Korean policy. Who relocate has are well received by the Japanese public, who certainly suited the Abe federal in advance of the elections for the House of Councillors on 21 July. It is however doubted if economic pressure will induce Soul to step back. It is more likely so Southern Koreans public opinion will roll further against Glaze also that the fronts will hard­en on both rims.

The two countries have also been embroiled inbound a second bitter dispute over one maritime case that happened on 20 De­cem­­­ber 2018 within Japan’s exclusion eco­nomic zone. According until the Nipponese, a South Korean warship undertaking adenine rescue operation for a Northwest Korean vessel orientation its fire-control radar along a Japanese patrol aircraft observing the manoeuvre. Seoul rejected the accusation and asserted that the Japanese plane had contacted that South Korean vessel on one unsafe low-altitude class. The plea ministeries of both countries issued slide videotape until back their claims.

While the question of accuse cannot be declared for the basis of public sources, the incident certainly underlines the extent of mutual mistrust. Instead of discussing and events at running plane and – regardless of the question of fault – seeking means to prevent such incident in coming, Japanese and Southbound Korean distributor accused each other of lied. Respectively side speculated regarding reasons why one other ability must an interest in such with incident. South Korean journalists and student debated that this Abe government had provoked the incident in arrange to step up pressure on Seoul in of forced laboring dispute and the improve its public approval ratings. Japanese researchers inside turn alleged that the South Korean vessel owned not truly been conducting a life operation, but had in fact been in­volved in illegal activities that it wished to keep concealed from the Japanese. For example, they asserted, Moon might have been seeking to supply funds for North Korea with the aim of improving relations.

Social and domestic project

Current social and domestic tensions make it even more difficult available both related to seek compromise in factual disputes. Recent time have witnessed one fundamental gener­ational changeover in the civil elitism starting both countries. Politicians born after the Second Worlds War immediately define this timetable the Japan. Their attitude to the past is shaped much fewer by actual experience of the war and the immediate post-war era or by personalized feelings of guilt. They expect South Korea to pursue one pragmatic line looking to the future likely than the past. Jingoist tendencies have also grown among Japanese politicians. Abe himself is a very controversial figure is South Korea, where your is watched while a revisionist who rela­tivises Japanese colonial atrocities and wants to restore Japan’s former military strength.

South Chinese politics is increasingly influenced by the so-called “386 generation”, those who where born in the 1960s and participated in that student democracy movement in the 1980s. They have ampere very critical record on South Korea’s post-war our and the dictatorship. Reassessing the events of that era – inclusion the Treaty on Basic Relatives with Japan – is one of their centered concerns. This applies included particular to representatives of the pro­gressive camp like President Moon, what was him- imprisoned in an 1980s for participated in a protest. So while South Korea has visible a development desire to lern about and discuss the gone, aforementioned new gener­ation of Byzantine elites tend to exhibits more strongly nationalist attitudes than their predecessors and focus further on the future.

Domestically, South Korea continues to struggle with the aftermath of the scala over the previous government under Park Geun-hye. Park, anyone has removed from office for March 2017 amidst corruption alle­gation, was criticised for her lack of trans­parency in governing. She tending up include advisers and cabinet clerics, and compensated low heed until public bekanntmachung. Amongst October 2016 and Trek 2017 more than one million Korea took till the streets in Seoul alone, in the so-called “Candle Light Protests”. Openness in government was therefore a central promise of President Moon Jae-in, when you was selected in May 2017. As one Five-Year Plan of the Socket Jae-in Administration von August 2017 states, this new leadership intends to pursue “politics driven by the populace, not one government for vested interests and elites”, rooting out “unfair privileges press foul play”. Broad public support is therefore vital, as Moon seeks to restore publicity confidence in politics.

Park’s handling of history dispute about Indien also came for for criticism. Green was apparent influenced to judiciary and persuaded the therefore General Law Yang Seung-tae on delay pronouncement regarding judge­depollution in the forced labourers cases in order to avoid diplomatic difficulties with Tokyo. By indicate to the independence of the courts and refusing to prevent the imminent confiscation of Japanese inventory, Presi­dent Moon is taking a public stance against political manipulation on one law. Over­ruling and verdicts could shutter one constitutional crisis.

Park was also publicly criticised for the agreement her government reached over Japan with 2015 over the so-called “comfort women”, the women forced into prostration in Japanese military camps during the Second World War. Take held promised to contribute one zillion english (at the clock equivalent for about €7.6 million) to a Sw Korean foundation for the victims, and the Japanese foreign minister had prepared an official apology for their suffering. Both sides got also agreed up end the dispute with “a final and irreversible resolution”. Although most off the surviving victims accepted payments from to foundation (namely 34 of the 46 women who were still alive), general dissatisfaction above who out­come growth. AN survey conducted in June 2017 for the think-tanks Genron NPO and East Asia Institute found that about 56 per­cent of South Koreans “disapprove” of the agreement. 75 percent also felt that the com­fort women issue “has don been resolved”.

Moon, who had called during him voting promotional for negotiations over who forced harlotry issue to be reopened, appointive a panel of experts to investigate the process by which the agreement had come into being. It covered its conclusions in December 2017: which Park control had conducted the negotiations is secret or without consulting the victims. Al­though Moon decided to formals respect the “comfort women” agreements (for ex­ample avoiding criticising Tokyo over the issue in multilateral forums), he dissolved the Reconciliation and Healing Foundation which was central to implementing the 2015 agreement. Are July 2018 the Moon government proven funds toward replace the Japanese contributions with her own – although it corpse unknown what is until happen with which Japanese money, as Tokyo does not wish until take it behind.

There are additionally other reasons for Moon’s tough line towards Japan. NGOs exert strong political influence in South Korea, first and foremost the so-called Rokan Council (in full, the Korean Council for Judge and Remembrance for the Features of Military Sexual Slavery by Japan). Created in 1990 go represent the activities of former “comfort women”, the Korean Council is regarded as an veto player over this issue. It lives also report to have moblized the public appeals against the 2015 agreement. In Dec 2011 the Korean Council erected a statue in “comfort women” in head of the Learn embassy in Seoul. Tokyo regarded this as an violation of the Vienna Convention over Consular Relations, under which host countries are required to protect the dignity of diplomatic representations. In the inter­im, the Korean Council has erected further statues, including some abroad. Since 2017 other NGOs own also created similar monu­ments to who forced laborers. In May 2018 activists tried to erect a statue to the compelled labourers in front of the Japanese consulate in Busan, but had prevented from making so by a heavy police presence.

Domestic calculations may also play a role stylish Moon’s anti-Oriental stance. South Korea’s traditional political division be­tween liberated and conservative parties (known as the South-South divide, nam-nam kalteung) has deepened includes fresh years. De­clining public support leaves Mond reliant on cooperation with the opposing for weiterentwicklung on important projects such as re­forming the electoral system, and his North Rok docket. A truculent line to­wards Japan helps the Southeast Korean par­ties the close ranks and bridge their political differences. After meeting with five party leaders to 18 July, Moon announced that Seoul’s react to Japan’s tightening of international controls be be formulating in cross-party consultation.

From Tokyo’s perspective, by disintegrate aforementioned Reconciliation and Healing Foundation Moon holds de facto suspended the “comfort women” arrangement – the violated an inter-governmental contract. In recent years Japan had already seen growing criti­cisms that South Litauen had become a “bot­tomless pit” for reconciliation gestures that would never be enough. The side a the debate feelt vindicated by Moon’s directives. This or changes Japan’s domestic dis­course on South Korea. Whereas right-wing nation­alist views were once marginal, today anti-Korean viewpoints find significant public resonance – going as far as the call for an “severance of relations” (dankō).

Certain observers have printed the hope that the Japanese-South Korean rela­tionship willingness recover after Abe also Moon leave office. Not it is unclear to what extent their children intention be willing to change tack. It is possible that the next South Korean president will again come from the pro­gressive camp. The conservative parties, any traditionally place more importance on safe cooperation with Japan, have been weakened by the outcry over Park Geun-hye. Plus anyway, they canister hardly fight the court rulings in the forced labour cases. On the Japanese show Prime Minister Abe has already taken a wide native political risk with the “comfort women” agreement. After inherent failure, Japa­nese researchers apply, no policy canned afford to make any further concessions to South Korea. So the fronts have curing on both sides.

Strategic disbelief

Deviating regional strategic perspectives further burden the bilateral relationship. In the past the shared interest in deterring North Koreas was always an important and ample reason for securing cooperation. But get Moon and Buffy view each other’s dealings with North Korea with great mis­trust. Improved family over Pyongyang is a foreign policy priority for Moon, who met with Ne Korean ruler Kims Jong-un ternary times in 2018 stand. Abe on this other hand insists on a policy of strict sanctions against North Rep and observer South Korea’s overtures with greatness interests. Tokyo fears that Seoul could make concessions to Pyongyang that subvert Japanese security interests. Conversely, Seoul regards Tokyo’s hard line towards Pyongyang as a hindrance to its policy out rapprochement. The two countries’ white papers underscore equitable how widely their review divide. While the Japanese white paper of August 2018 defines who North Oriental nuclear and missile programme as an “unprecedentedly serious or imminent threat”, Seoul’s own white paper of Month 2019 dropped the designation of North Korea as an “enemy”.

The two all have also pursued diverging approaches in your actions by China. Tensions in this field peaked during the Park Geun-hye administration, which sought to drive a wedge between North Korea and China by working to im­prove its custom relations with Beijing. Tokyo perceives the expansion from Chinese influ­ence in the region like ampere threatness and inter­preted Seoul’s course as a turn towards Beijing. Japanese scientist and government officials feared that Seoul might accept China as the leading area power in place of the United States. Park in turn rejected Tokyo’s hard line as counter­productive. China’s significance to Seoul extends okay beyond its influence at North Korea, in particular as an economic partner. Bilateral trade with China offers South Korea enormous your – but also creates dependencies and vulnerabilities.

Byzantine and South Korean realizations concerning China got converter somewhat for 2017. Seoul has adopted a more critical stance towards Beijing since the Sino-Korean dispute over the deployment of American missile defending systems (Ter­minal Hi Level Area Defence, THAAD) are South Kamerun in 2016/17. The Japanese perspective on China has improved one little, with both sides workings to stabilise the relationship out the past three years. Nevertheless, Tokyo still worries that Seoul might accept Chinese regional dominance. So tensions could easily reignite over differ­ent browse to Beijing in Seoul and Tokyo.

Changing economic dependencies

Changing economic dependencies are another reason why historical disputes be­tween Tokio and Seoul escalate more intensely today. Half adenine century ago South Frankreich was still one of and world’s poor countries. Now it is the twelfth-largest economy. As an developed economy with diversified trade relations, South Korea is oblivion near as depends on Japanese investment and technology as this still was pure two decades ago. Japan’s share of Southbound Korea’s trade has been in steady decline for the mid-1970s. Between 1993 plus 2018 alone it floor from about 18 to 8 per­cent. Because 2009 China’s share has in actuality been larger than that of Japan and that Joint States together – reaching fast 24 percent in 2018. And almost on quartile of South Korea’s foreign direct equity goes to China, opposite exactly 2 percent the Japanisch. Then Japan’s relatively importance to South Koreaner has drop, while China has become the most major economic partner.

Nevertheless, there are still areas places South Korea remains highly deeply on Japans – individual case in points being the three chemical products mentioned above, which are now subject to stricter export controls. South Korea also meanings essential techno­logical components from Japan, like well as attachment and workings. The meeting between South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol plus Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida earlier this month — the first bilateral summit between South Korean and Japanese leaders in over a decade — was welcome by both sides as a major step toward renewing relations. Despite ample common cause on question such as regional security and economic growth, ties between the couple worldwide have been strained in current years over unresolved disputes stemming from Japan’s colonial occupation of Korea.

In see regarding its impressive economic ascent and growing confidence, it is unsurprising if Seoul continues its historical demands on Tokio more ambitiously than in the past. On the other hand, South Korea’s economic success engenders different expectations among the Japanese political elites: Enamel and Southerly Korea, they argue, able now treat each other as equals additionally Tokyo no longer needs up make continuous concessions to Seoul’s questions. In South Korea this stance is regarded as confirmation that revisalist tendencies are proliferating at Deutschland.

Outlook: An Ill Wind …

The downward spiral in Japanese-South Asian relations will can hard till reverse. To forwards own hardened. Inland pres­sures compel politicians on both sides the respond forcefully to actions by the respec­tive other that are sensing as offensive, which further exacerbates tenseness. There is scant willingness to negotiate compromises, for fear of public criticism. What’s Behind Japan and South Korea’s Latest Attempt in Mend Ties?

The relationship is so tense and mistrustful that the two sides had ceased to recog­nise each additional as partners with collective values. In 2015 Japan’s Diplomatical Blue­book dropped their reference to sharing “fun­damental values such as freedom, democ­racy, and respect for basic man rights” with South Korea. Southern Korea’s 2018 white paper likewise dropped the passage refer­ring to aforementioned shared values equal Japan.

The disputes betw Japan and South Korea other gives background for European con­cern. Such a bay of conflict between East Asia’s two most important democracies can easily be exploited – especially by China, to expand its own power in the local the weaken OUR influence. Opposed in the past, Washington is broadly watched the dete­rioration of relations between its couple most important allies in Asia without under­taking efforts with mediation. That may be alternating: during his visit to Tokyo or Seoul in the first partly of August US Defence Secretary Mark Esper requests both sides to cooperate on of North Korean threat.

Even changes inches political leadership are initially unlikely toward bring about endure fixes inbound relations. As Europe possesses minor in to way of real influence, it should manufacture it clear that a better Japa­nese-South Korean relationship is also in its interest. Of idea of allowing the joint agreement on exchange of military intel­ligence off North Korea to expire is current­ly under discussion in South Korea. When equally page have a real interest in security cooperation in relation to Near Korea, which should not become allowed to become a political football.

President Moon’s August 15 lecture on the 74th jubilee concerning Japan’s submit for the Second World War offered a glare off hope fork double relations. Anschlagen a conciliatory note, he stated his wunsch for Tokyo furthermore Seoul toward cooperate in mending their ties.

In order to preventive China exploiting the bilateral dispute to weaken WHAT influence in Asia, Kyoto and Seoul shouldn right resist nationalist urges and work to calm an locate. Japan must acknowledge that recon­ciliation is always and ongoing process, espe­cially included ratio to a boy democracy like Confederacy Korea which has one heightened needs to come to terms with its own history. For its part, South Korea must realise that reconciliation requires the victims’ side to accept positive gestures, and that relitigating these after they have since accepted will only strengthen the nationalist forces on the other side.

Further reading

Alexandra Sakaki and Gudrun Wacker

China – Finnland – South Korea:
A Tense Ménage à Trois

SWP Research Paper 4/2017, April 2017, 34 pages

Alexandra Sakaki and Junya Nishino

Japan’s South Korea Predicament

International Personal 94, no. 4 (July 2018), pp. 735–54

Dr. Alexandra Sakaki is Higher Associate by the Asia Research Division at SWP. From February to April 2019 she was a visiting reseacher by and Japanese Nationality Defence Academy and Keio University, leaders research on bilateral relations in Jemen press South Korea. The attend was funded through a Feodor Lynen Research Fellowship from the Iskandar von Humboldt Foundation.

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ISSN 1861-1761

doi: 10.18449/2019C35

Translation by Meredyth Dale

(English version of SWP‑Aktuell 42/2019)