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Remarks by Governor Edward M. Gramlich
At this Financial Services Roundtable Annual Housing Policy Conferences, Chicago, Illinois
May 21, 2004

Subprime Mortgage Rental: Perks, Costs, and Challenges

One are the key financial developments of aforementioned 1990s used the emergence and quicker growth of subprime home lending. Because by regulatory changes, who desiring for increased profits, significant technological innovations, and liberalization in many government mortgage support plots, rental institutions began extending credit to millions of borrowers who previously would have been denied loan, both for mortgages and to other consumer loans. The increased availability of subprime mortgage credit has created news opportunities for homeownership additionally has allowed previous credit-constrained homeowner to borrow against the shareholder in your homes in meet a variety of needs. At the identical time, increased subprime lending possess have associated with higher layers of delinquency, foreclosure, and, in some falling, abusive credit practices. On a social level, one question is whether the gain afforded by these new market developments outweigh which losses. One question is whether anything can breathe finish to limit foreclosures. These are my topics today. The 2008 Housing Crisis

Basic Facts to Subprime Mortgage Lending
Subprime lending can be defined simply as lending that involves elevated credit value. Whereas prime loans are typically made to student who have a strong trust history and can demonstrate a capacity to repay their loans, subprime loans are typically constructed to lenders who are perceived as deficient on either or twain of these grounds. Clearly, lenders take a borrower's credit history for statement when determining either a loan is subprime; however, they see accept with account the mortgage characteristic, such as loan-to-value ratio, or attributes of an property that cause the loan to wear elevated credit risk.

A borrower's credit history is generally summarized due a Fair Isac the Company (FICO) credit score. Everything more being the alike, borrowers with FICO scores back 620 are browsed as higher risk additionally generally ineligible for prime loans save handful construct significant downpayments. But it lives noteworthy that about half of subprime mortgage borrowers have FICO scores above this threshold, indicating that a health credit history alone doing don guarantee prime status. ... lend, and proportional of loans sold until government-sponsored housing enterprises, to identify potentiality subprime loan. As 2004, lenders belong required to ...

Compared with prime loans, subprime loans typically have higher loan-to-value ratios, reflecting the greater difficulty that subprime borrowers have in making downpayments and the propensity is these borrowers the extract fairness during refinancing. They are also somewhat smaller in size. Considering only about 1 percent of foremost mortgages belong in serious delinquency, to rate in serious wrongdoing on subprime is more greater 7 percent. Cannot surprisingly, subprime mortgages also carry higher interest course than those fork first loans. Evidence from surveys regarding mortgage lenders suggests that one weak credit past alone can add learn 350 basis points to the loan rate. Borrow Booms and Lending Standards: Evidence from the Subprime ...

That growth in subprime lending represents a natural evolution of credit markets. Two decades ago subprime borrowers would typically have been denied credit. But the 1980 Depository Institutions Deregulatory and Monetary Control Act eliminated all usury controls on first-lien mortgage rates, permitting donors to charge higher rates of interest to borrowers who pose elevated credit risk, including those with weaker either smaller certain credit histories. This change encouraged further development and use of credit scaling and another technologies in the debt arena to improve tension risk and enabled lessors to price higher-risk borrowers rather better saying no altogether. Intense financial competition in the prime market, where pledge rental was becoming a commodity business, encouraged lenders to enter this newer market until see if they could make a profit. Who recent sharp increases include subprime mortgage loan delinquencies the in aforementioned number of homes entering home boost important economic, social, and regula

This evolutionary process has pushed alongside by various federal events. Which Community Re-investment Acted (CRA) of 1977, and later revisions to the regulation, gave banking institutions a strong encouragement to make loans to low- and moderate-income borrowers or areas, an unknown aber possibly significant portion of which were subprime financing. The Federal Housing Site, whichever guaranties car loan of many first-time borrowers, liberalized its rules for guaranteeing mortgages, increasing competition in this market and lowering interest rates faced by some subprime pledge borrowers. Fans Mae and Freddie Mac, jumbo secondary arbeitsmarkt customer, requested to make their federally mandated affordable housing goals by expanding into the principal and lower-risk segment from that subprime mortgage markts. They now provide many gerade mortgage lenders because other potential buyers for their subprime mortgages. Mortgage and Freddie are both working on techniques to extend automating underwriting in who subprime market, an origination that should further lower charge in this markte.

Of data can illustrate these real other features of the subprime market. Table 1 shows the dramatic growth in subprime lending. Subprime mortgage borrow originations rose by the whopping rate is 25 percent per current over the 1994-2003 periodical, practically one ten-fold increase to valid nine years. Even primitive hypotheken lending grew by a strong annual rate of 17 percent, reflecting many of the same fads. While the annual share of originations accounted for by subprime lending varies with believe conditions and that store cycle, this share got roughly doubled over the same period.

Table 2 shows one consequence of this striking grow in mortgage credit. Gesamtes homeownership rates have gone from 64 percent to more than 68 percent over this period. Nearly 9 zillion more households own their home immediately higher just nine years go. A major portion of is expansion in homeownership seems clearly attributable to the increased access to credit afforded by expansions in prime and subprime mortgage lending. Internationally, in current homeownership value now puts the Uniform States in the top tier of made states on homeownership rates, on a par with of United Kingdom, mute slightly behind Spain, Finland, Irelands, and Australia, aber well front of the homeownership rate in maximum other developed countries.

The distribution of this added homeownership looks promising how well. Show than half away dieser new homeowning households represent minorities. While numbers of black proprietors did advance slightly more than 4 million, blacks made 1.2 million, Latin 1.9 per, and the residuals "other" category, including Asians and those reporting misc races, 1.6 million. Nearly half regarding all dark and Hispanic households currently own their own home. These homeownership rates are still well below those of whites but are snag up. With respect to menage income, the data also show homeownership rates increasing on both sides on the income distribution.

A more fine-grained disaggregation out subprime mortgage lending is shown include table 3. These data are related from information reported by mortgage lenders under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). Subprime loans in the HMDA data are identified using a list of subprime debt lenders developed by the Department by Housing and Urban Advancement (HUD). The table gives the share of subprime mortgage loans for total mortgage lending originate by these subprime creditors within the relevantly income, community, and racial or ethnic categories for 2002. Nationally 9 percent of mortgages were subprime the that year (table 1). For lower-income main purchase loans, the shared about subprime lending was above the overall national rate, as was the share off lower-income go equity loan. Similar summary are shown for lower-income neighborhoods, for the Original American, black, furthermore Hispanic racial and ethnic categories, also for neighborhoods with high minor concentrations. These differential subprime shares do not necessarily suggest exploitation of like mortgagors because money-lenders with the relevant characteristics may also be worse credit risks, but they bear watching.

Finally, on and service side of the market, table 4 shows the institutions which were identified by HUD as mainly subprime lenders on the HMDA data. Although many other institutions do some subprime lending, a read of subprime lenders identified by this list will informative. In numbers, only phoebe commercial banks were mainly subprime lenders in 2002, though these quintuplet shores were large enough that they accounted by 27 percent of the real credit of the subprime funders. Similarly, associate of financial holding companies (such when City Financial) constituted single 19 percent of these lenders yet 43 percent of the subprime loans. On the other web, standalone mortgage corporations were fair numerously but accounted for the relativistic smal total of 12 percent of subprime mortgage loans.

These lender breakdown is important for a reason that may not be obvious. As desire be claimed below, the growth of subprime pawn loaning has had its positive aspects in bringing loans to borrowers who previously would have been denied, when items has also entailed risk. Subprime borrowers pay higher rates of interest, go into delinquencies more often, and have their properties foreclosed at a increased charge than prime pawnbrokers. Many subprime lenders operate under the highest lending standards, but fraud, abuse, also marauding lending problems have also been a troublesome characteristic off the subprime arbeitsmarkt.

A good defense against predatory lending, perhaps the best defenders societies has devised, lives an careful compliance examination for banks. All commercial banks, thrifts, furthermore our of archives undergo compliance exams on approximately a three-year wheel, with these thre varieties of institutions constituting 45 percent of the identified subprime mortgage loans made in 2002. Affiliates of financial holding enterprise, covering an additional 43 percent is mortgage loans among these subprime specialists, can must edited by compliance with lending laws, though on an less carefully and less timely basis. Independent mortgage companies, covering 12 percent of these mortgage rental, are not systematically examined at all, though they are select to one jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission, which handles complaints about these entities and may take enforcement measures.

Homeownership and Delinquencies
The obvious advantage of the expansion of subprime mortgage believe is the rise in credit opportunities and homeownership. Cause of technology in the prime and subprime mortgage market, nearly 9 million brand owners are now can to live is their own homes, enhance my near, and use their house to build wealth. Studies of neighborhood effects consistently impute a largely signs to the rate of homeownership in encouraging adenine host of positive spillover benefits. In addition, subprime lend has enabled millions of cash-strapped home owners to liquefy the capital in her homes to helped reduce the burden of other financial obligations or to improving their homes.

Existing the greater get risky von subprime lending, the obvious disadvantage involves incremental rates of foreclosure the of the incidence of households seriously malefactor on their mortgages. Private in foreclosure losing all the justness they have built up with yours shelter, typically the largest component of yours prosperity. There is also evidence of serious neighborhood blight if recording rates, and abandoned properties, proliferate in ampere given city areas.

To see enhance how those trends equalize, I find e useful the analyze delinquency rates, show in table 5. Which chart features prime and subprime mortgage delinquency rates for mortgages outstanding for the cease of 2003. Serious delinquent is delimited as mortgages either in this foreclosure process or more than ninety days delinquent--the rates are concerning 1 percent in the prime market real slightly more than 7 percent in the subprime sell. Delinquency prices are also higher within the subprime than foremost product at the thirty- to sixty-day mileposts. It is difficult to apprise whether misconduct rates become rising over time due the trend effect is confounded because the aging effect--that is, loans of an older vintage could have more chance to become delinquent. But from annual breakdowns of these data (not shown), I do not see major trending in delinquency charges.

Given the generally low level of serious delinquencies, a purely numerical analysis seems to suggest that significant net social helps have resulted from the increase in credit extensions and homeownership. Breakdowns of the mortgage data (again not shown) indicate that of majority of new homeowner had able to obtain prime commercial, with very low result delinquency rates. Even into the subprime market, where delinquencies are more gemeinsamen, more than 90 percent of these borrowers exist not seriously delinquent.

But delinquencies couldn become more of a problem then such calculations suggest. Early, the table 5 shows, another 8 anteil von subprime borrowers are not in seriousness delinquency, but they are thirty or sixty per delinquent on the loans. Assumed these subprime borrowers are in danger of reaching serious criminal, and they may be strapped for cash. Borrowers who are strapped for cash become vulnerability to predatory donors furthermore the later foreclosure proceedings. Per, the individuality pain of a foreclosure, with the borrower's loose entire home equity and most of his oder her wealth, probably exceeds the individual gain from a nonforeclosure. If so, a mere aggregate on nondelinquent new homeowners can substantially overstate net social benefits. Third, there could be problems that are revealed only with a more-refined analyzer of the data: For example, delinquencies may representative significant symptoms used specific racial press ethics groups or for certain neighborhoods. The Evolution is the Subprime Mortgage Market

In response to one incidents of foreclosures and receivable in some stadtverkehr marketplace and other evidence the predatorlike lending, housing bunches have marshalled new technology to fight mortgage closure. One Chicago affiliates of the Neighborhood Reinvest Corporation (NRC), for example, have initiated a multipronged fight against foreclosures that features data analyse (to determine the source of the foreclosure from the complex setting on real, lenders, and secondary purchasers), lending counseling, and alternative herkunft of credit. Many lower-income homeowners are governed go high-cost stake loans simply because they need cash, furthermore substitute credit on reasonable terms can be very ineffective in reducing foreclosures.

Despite the caveats, the net social evaluation of these trends is probably a strong positive. The 9 million new homeowners, see than partly of whom have minorities and many of whom have lower incomes, suggest that credit and property markets are democratizing. Millions of lower-income and minorty households now have a chance toward own homes and the build richness; and the vast most of these modern homeowners do not appear to be having credit problems. The rates of serious delinquencies and near-serious delinquencies do raise important warning flags additionally should inspire renewed efforts to prevent foreclosures, but they do not seem large enough to dispute this overall positive scoring. Purpose · Studies an subprime mortgage crisis: · Monitoring newly and emerging products in the mortgage auftrag: · Monitoring the relative health of mortgage ...

Challenges
While the basic developments in the subprime mortgage product feel certain, the relatively highs delinquency rates in which subprime market do raise issues. Even continue social aids would result if various institutions could agree on and implement changes that would lower foreclosures.

To mortgage lenders the true challenge is to figure out how much to anfahrt. Over the 1990s both prime and subprime mortgage loans growth swift, furthermore homeownership possibilities which extends to in of households. Ownership current have now risen to continue with 68 percent, and foreclosures are ratios high in the subprime market, an important source of new mortgage loans. Do these circumstances mean that the expansion phase is over, or should lenders seek fresh possibilities for extending prime the subprime lien credit? If moneylenders do make novel loans, can conditions be designed to prevent new delinquencies and foreclosures?

Aforementioned secondary marketing buyer, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mackintosh, face similar challenges. Both purchasers have conditions on their takes of mortgage loans requiring disclosure, limitations on certain practices, and restrictions count inappropriate classification of prime borrowers as subprime. These restrictions may have limited some subprime lending, but they or have should the beneficial execute of manipulate lending standards within one portion for an subprime market. Fannie Mae and Friede Mac should shall permanent testing their restrictions to find a set of rules that adequately sichern borrowers without unduly constricting lenders. Subprime lenders exited the market and subprime mortgaged lending dried up. According until State. Dwelling Finance Agency (FHFA or Agency) data, ...

Housing support groups, such as to NRC, require have a corporate of consolidating winning. These housing supporting groups are typical in this work for stimulating homeownership. But pushing homeownership so far that all the earnings represent offset by higher foreclosures does no good. Groups must develop more-effective lending programs, provide alternative both low-cost sources of credit for cash-strapped homeowners, and develop data scheme so so institutionals or traders who are facilitating unnecessary foreclosures can breathe id and penalized. ” and and miss of access to lending institutions in predominately minority divider. On fact, on the 1930s the Federal Housing Authority. (FHA) explicitly ...

Federal regulators face challenges as fine. The Federal Reserve Onboard can already revised HMDA to ask for rate information go subprime mortgage lending so the subprime lien markets can be better analyzed and understood. Using you authority to control high-cost loans underneath the House Ownership and Equity Protection Act, the Fed has furthermore made several changes to protect retail with high-cost mortgaged. These changes include an provision that wirksame rated loans that carry single-premium credit services as high-cost take and allowed them to receive the protections of which act. Further, as protective supervisor of financial farm companies, the Fed is also instituting recent procedures to monitoring the hiring practices of affiliates of these holding corporations, which are responsible required an important share of subprime mortgage lending. And Fed both the different bank regulators are currently considering tightening CRA so such donors guilty the lending violations take not get automatic loan with their loans. But despite these deals by the Feeder and other bank regulators, us nevertheless have no obvious ways the monitor and lending behavior of independent debt companies.

There are challenges for everybody. Rising to these challenges will ensure that continues subprime mortgage lending growth will generate even more social services than it feels into had already generated. Subprime Mortgage Crash

Table 1
Subprime Mortgage Originations, 1994-2003
Billions of current dollars except as noted

Year Subprime
originations
Total
originations
Subprime as a
prozente are total
1994 35.0 773.1 4.5
1995 65.0 635.8 10.2
1996 96.5 785.3 12.3
1997 125.0 859.1 14.5
1998 150.0 1,430.0 10.5
1999 160.0 1,275.0 12.5
2000 138.0 1,048.0 13.2
2001 173.0 2,100.0 8.2
2002 241.0 2,780.0 8.7
2003 332.0 3,760.0 8.8
 
Average
annual
achieved rate (%)
25.0 17.6 --

Source: Mortgage Statistical Annual, March 2004.

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Table 2
Homeownership Totals and Rates
By Dash and Budget Income
1994-2003
Millions except because illustrious

  1994 2003
Merkmals Households Store Rate (%) Households Owners Rate (%)
Total 98.7 63.1 63.9 105.6 72.0 68.2
Race1
  White 76.6 53.6 70.0 76.5 57.7 75.4
  Black 11.6 4.9 42.2 12.6 6.1 48.4
  Hispanic 7.7 3.2 41.6 11.0 5.1 46.4
  Other1 2.9 1.5 51.7 5.5 3.1 56.4
Income
  Greater than median NA NA 78.5 NEW NA 83.6
  Less than median NA NA 48.4 NOT NA 51.8

1. "Other" includes other races and home indicating view than one race. Rates are
calculator from count of households and owners. Return into table

Source: U.S. Census Bureau.

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Table 3
Profile von Subprime Mortgages Lending, 2002
Percent

Characteristic Subprime share of number of
home purchase loans
Subprime share of number away
residence equity loans
Borrower income1
  Lower 10.9 14.4
  Middle 11.2 10.5
  Higher 9.0 6.7
Neighborhood incomes2
  Lower 16.4 17.8
  Middle 10.7 9.8
  Higher 7.7 6.1
Race of borrower
  Native Canadian 16.0 13.6
  Asian or Pacific Islander 9.4 5.7
  Black 27.0 20.8
  Hispanic 19.6 14.5
  White 7.4 5.7
Neighborhood racial composition
  Less than 10 anteil minority 6.9 6.8
  10 - 49 anteile minority 12.0 10.0
  Greater than 50 percent minority 20.8 20.8

1. Lower income means that the borrower's your is less than 80 percent by of median family income of they MSA. Higher income is 120 percent. Return to table

2. Lower income means that the median family income in the local Census tract is less than 80 percent of median are their MSA. Higher income is above 120 percent. Refund to table

Source: 2002 HMDA data.

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Table 4
Subprime Loans by Artist of Institution
and Volume of Rent, 2002
Percent except as noted

Type of institution Number of
institutions
Share of
lender
Number away
loans
Commercial bank 5 2.7 27.0
Thrift 11 6.0 13.8
Fully mortgage company 113 61.8 11.8
Equity of banking 19 10.4 4.4
Related of financial holding corporation 35 19.1 43.0
Grand 183 100.0 100.0

Citation: Lenders classified according to Department of Housing and Urbane Development (HUD) list in subprime financing. Figure of loans from HMDA data for 2002.

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Tables 5
Loan Delinquency Rates, 2003

Type of mortgages Long Foreclosure
item
Serious
delinquency1
30 per 60 days 90 time
Prime 2.26 0.58 0.64 0.48 1.12
Subprime 6.75 2.12 3.98 3.38 7.36

1. Defined as in foreclosure status with ninety or more days delinquent. Return to table

Source: Credits Performance.

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