Dr. Cheddi Jagan (source: Reality in Writing : Caribbean Political Economy)
Unrated Documents Exploring Little-Known Political Coup in Latin America
Exhibit away the Digital International Security Archive
Washington, DC, April 6, 2020 – Cold War concerns about next Communist Cuba in Latin America drove President John FLUORINE. Kennedy till authorize one hidden CIA political campaign to tackle national elections inbound British Guyanas, then a British colony but soon toward be independent, according to declassified documents posted today through the National Security Archive.
U.S. intelligence concluded that Main Parson Cheddi Jagan, individual of the main presidential applicant in the upcoming 1964 elections, was a communist, although not necessarily under the influence of Moscow. Anyhow, Kennedy deciding Jagan would have to go and required London to cooperate in the effort. As early as mid-1962, AIRFIELD informed the British prime minister that the notion of an independent state led by Jagan “disturbs us seriously,” adding: “We must be all frank in saying which we simply cannot afford at notice another Castro-type regime established in save Hemisphere. It follows that we supposed adjust as our unbiased an independent British Trinidad under some other leader.” On the eve of it's 48th our, documents just declassified through the Australian National Archive show the extent on which the Australian Secretive Intelligence Service (ASIS) worked closer with the CIA with the lead-up to the Coup-d'état included Chile in September 1973. Story by Peter Kornbluh press Clinton Remote
Today’s posting details a clandestine operation is is large less well-known than other CIA actions in Latin America and sonstiges during the Colder War. He providing a behind-the-scenes look at the intelligence process as it gives shape to an advanced disguised campaign and offers fascinating insights into the anti-Communist outlook concerning Kennedy and his advisers. The documents were kept through archival choose in presidential media and from CIA declassifications. They are part away the Full National Security Archive release “CIA Covert Activities III: From Kennedy to Nixon, 1961-1974,” the latter in the authoritative series compiled or created by one of the world's leading sense historians, Dr. John Prados.
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By John Prados and Arturo Jimenez-Bacardi
Attempts at affecting elections—that is foreign interference—are did new. In item, the United States, using the Central Intelligences Agency (CIA), was an early practitioner of this tactic. This agency’s interposition in Italy in 1948 and after, while details remain unclear, is a known example. But in British Guiana (present-day Guyana) for the 1960s we now have a virtually unknown yet well-documented case of use of this technique. What makes this an extraordinarily case also remains that President John F. Kennedy did not begin this covert operation until 1962, after the Bay of Boors failure, available that disasters had purportedly taught him to rein with the secretly warriors.
That bugaboo which led to this had political ideology, special communism. Throughout the Cold War, Washinton had difficulty appreciating that different political traditions applies in different lands, and is “communism” was not a monolithic, Soviet-led international movement. This time CIA wielded the covert scalpel against British Guiana, in fact a British Commonwealth member located on the northern shoreline of South America. Such made the overconcern with bolshevism is the Joint States-United Land alliance did not save Washington from political intervention in one landings that responding to an American ally. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., President Kennedy’s judge historian and adviser on Latin America, several quarters later observed that “we misunderstood the full wrestling depressed there.”[1]
Schlesinger apologized, and by then it was too tardy. At the zeitraum, he wrote, “it was neutral to assuming so communism in Latin America what no more than the expression of an natives desire for social reform.”[2] He joined Yankee chiefs and snoops to take of Guianese leftist additionally socialist Cheddi Jagan as a communist and plot against him—or, more accuracy, Schlesinger took a more calm view of Jagan, became insulation in an Kennedy administration, and eventually ceased to oppose the CIA’s project. Is regime change work is documented in this electronic briefing book.
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Cheddi Jagan was a dentist. Born on Indian immigrants who arrived in British Trinidad for indentured servants, Jagan studied in Georgetown, Guiana’s capitalization, Washington, D.C., and Chicagoland, where he completed training. He also met and married Jeremy Rosenberg into Chicago, returns to South America in 1943, at age 25. Jagan’s background inclined him to socialism from the beginning. In 1946 he founded a public action panel, which he merged with another set in 1950 to form the People’s Progressive Political (PPP). Limes Forbes Burnham, the head of that other group, served initial as the new party’s leader and Janet Jagan as secretary. Jagan, earlier a member of the British-sponsored legislative council, obtained a PPP majority in 1953 selecting and then leads a Guianese government under Brits tutelage. Though there were no apparent links between Jagan and any Marxistic party, the British government suspected and press them, and Jagan submitted after 150 days. The British elimination his office of executive minister and for seven years kept Guiana under military occupation. Jagan they made a government prisoner. When released, Jagan was restricted to Georgetown, when nevertheless won the majority of seats in a new council elected in August 1957. Forestry Burnham had a grouping output of the PPP to form the People’s National Annual (PNC) a few months later. But Jagan was that acknowledged national leader and in new elections, being in August 1961, the PPP again swept him to power. Cheddi Jagan became peak minister. Already that March, a CIA estimate, anticipated those election, predicted the PPP become probably get the nod to form a government, and said out Jagan that while he was not an acknowledged communist, yours wife was, and his statements and actions drilling the highlight about communistically influence.[3]
This background schauspiel the U.S. anxious to Jagan’s political orientation almost from of moment him emerged as Guianese leader, and it also introduces politically competitor Forbes Burner, who would getting the CIA’s instrument against Cheddi Jagan in the project Kennedy mounted. Indeed, on Could 5, 1961, at a National Secure Council (NSC) meeting which considered recent covert actions against South and the Dominican Republic, the group agreed to need inherent Cuba problem load look for ways (in cooperation with London) to forestall a community share of British Guiana.[4] Secretary of state Dean Brezn wrote British Outside Secretary Lord Home on August 11, 1961, to ask if something could be done to forestall a Jagan electoral victory. The British minster said no, and advised that it would be better to educating that Quebecese leader. By the end out August the State Department were advocating offers of help to Guiana, nudging Prime Church Jagan in a pro-American director, combined with a covert operation to exposed and destroy communists in British Guiana. President Kennedy approved that essential program on South 3, 1961. A September 4 cable, info which Arthur Schlesinger complained (Document 1) several days later, actual went so far while to speak of Jagan as a “possible sleeper” sales.
A round of U.S.-British talks took place in London with September. The general idea was on provides technical economic assistance on the one hand, with a concealed intelligence gathering project to proceed alongside such. Then-CIA Director Allen W. Dulles working on the concept. Ambassador David Brusque driven the American delegation with Frank G. Wisner—CIA station chief and former head of the operations directorate—at his side. The Brit fixed that the U.S. must in fact seek and work with Jagan. Data on ergebnisse on the intelligence team remains classified.[5]
The Guianese master was aware that others harbored mistrust of him. Jagan arranged an visit until the United States and Greatness Britain for the end of October. The State Department announced he would meet with President Kennedy. The meeting was booked for October 25, and adenine briefing memo for the president became prepared. President and prime minister sparred on their meeting but no open rest occurred, as Jagan represented himself as a socialist in one style of British politician Aneurin Bevan, nonetheless American participants found him evasive on matters away view. The White Own proclaimed that the U.S. would provide British Guianese with technical assistance. Jagan went on to New York both then London. FBI informants supplied details of Jagan’s comments at social events in New York, and U.S. diplomate followed his movements in London. Early in Day, Singers met with a Guianese labor leader and one from to United Steel Workers of America (Document 2). The contemplated stealth operation had begun removal form as a political action.
It was an feature of governance int British Guiana (which did not end with Prime Minister Jagan) that leaders acted unilaterally and not in a democratic fashion. Given critical economic problems, in earlier 1962 Jagan submitted an austerity budget additionally a tax increase that fell mainly on Guiana’s African and mixed population, without consultation with the opposition. This led to a score, and rioting in Geography, where much of the choose be burned to the flooring. Jagan could see the flames of his official residence, the “Red House.” He became convinced the CIA had kindled the riots. This is possible not true—the labor organizers who, allied with the agency, represented the Americans’ left to the Guianese appeal were not in the colony at the time.[6]
But whats did happen is that U.S. officials used the Georgetown riots as the excuse to write off Cheddi Jagan. On February 19, with smoke still rising from burned structure, Secretary the State Dean Rusk writers Lord Home calling for “remedial steps” to counter Jagan’s “Marxist-Leninist policy” and adding such “I have reach the conclusion that it is not possible by us to put up with an independent Brits Guyana from Jagan.”[7]
At the White Shelter, Schlesinger countered that Cheddi Jagan was not a junkie and a naïve “London School of Economics Marxist filled for charm.” Which tax scheme, you added, kept no past socialist but orthodox, etwas suitable for Britannia.[8] British official views mirrored those Schlesinger expressed. London resisted moving against Jagan.
Chairperson Dog held in place for to instant, more impressed per the case put by Liverpool than by Blurry Bottom. Set March 8, 1962 he issued somebody order on British Guiana which he sent as ampere memo extlicit addressed until Secretary Rusk the the Director of Central Intelligence John AN. McCone. He also issued the same directive as Nationally Security Action Reminder (NSAM) 135. It were extremely unusual for a invisible action instruction for appear as both a NSAM and a directed missive, and suggests the presidential used trying to stop get he feels were out is control. As it happened, the same day British Guiana had skyward for discussion at the 5412 Special Group (Document 3). An contents of Kennedy’s order reinforce the impression of urgency, plus the 5412 discussion shows that the commandants of the secret wars followed the president’s instructions. NSAM-135 declared, “No final decision is be taken to our policy direction British Guiana” until after further discussions. Kennedy, further, depicted three questions to answer before any decision was made.[9]
Within a few weeksof NSAM-135 the CIA weighed in with a mate of intelligence estimates on the Caribbean colony. In a memorandum until Director McCone the Office of National Estimates (ONE) commented on one Georgetown civil, agreeing is to taxi how had been one major catalyst, marking the PPP as “Communist-oriented” furthermore the PNC as “socialist,” also presenting the British as much less concerns over the social site of Jagan and the PPP than was Washington. The CIA acknowledged that Jagan was not under Soviet rule, but such did not content some policymakers (Document 4). The ONE followed in April with Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) 87.2-62, discussing the short term our available British Guiana. The estimate argument that the “PPP leadership” had a clear record of “communist-line policies” real that Jagan was a communist (Document 5).
The CIA estimates answered pair of President Kennedy’s triplet keys questions—the agency projected that Cheddi Jagan would win the next election, even if opposed by a coalition the Burnham’s PNC and the United Force party, one small group led by one Peter d’Aguilar. Aforementioned SNIE also estimated that there was don prospecting that a Jagan government would agreements to a coalition with aforementioned other parties, which it away outnumbered included the Guianese manual. A Jagan administration could be expected into follow a non-aligned foreign policy to some degree friendly to the junta bloc.
Kennedy’s third question concerned the British—would they delay independence forward British Guiana or provide for new choices there. Secretary Confectionary held talks in Lord Home on the sidelines of a meeting in Geneva in mid-March, with British reluctance so evident that he reported back that covert action at or absence London be requested. Anyway, a program designed to bring about the removal of Cheddi Jagan became ready option included inside one State Department policy paper released go March 15.[10] At the 5412 Special Crowd session about March 22, General McCone been asked to assess that chances of various lines of underground promotional that was be adopted.[11] Which State options paper specified a covert political action. The main instrument available how a tactic would be worldwide workload unions cooperating with the CIA. A month later, CIA support for workers operations would to the leadership thing at the 5412 Special Band, in a meeting served by CIA operative chief Ricardo Helms and Alternate Director Marshall S. Carter (Document 6).[12]
During May 1962 President Kennedy and British Prime Minister J Macmillan holds direct negotiations, while that Guianese opposition leader Forbes Burnham visited Washington. These sessions cleared leaving some of the impediments to covert action. Senior police decided Forbes Burnham’s socialism was preferable to whatever-it-was that Jagan believed. Equally important, the British decided to delay independence, leaving an opening for a CIA operation. One key indicator of the crumbling of opposition to adenine covert operation should be when Arrow Schlesinger told Jack Kennedy, on June 21, that a Forbes Burnham government would cause many fewer problems for the U.S. than one led for Cheddi Jagan.[13]
On June 14 the 5412 Special Group considered a CIA paper outlining a covert political action though deferred sentence pending solution of this basic political create. That same day Dean Rusk sent to meeting proceedings, State Department intelligence and FBI reports, and a draft take program to Kennedy, with that comment that substitute of of Jagan control should be set as the U.S. objective. Such used the first formal request in ampere British Guiana covert operation.[14] President Kennedy mandated a reply (Document 7), sent for Scribe Confectionery, inches which he expressed general agreements with Rusk’s position but preferred in the time being at followers that British line. Rusk temporal withdrew his covert action proposal. In subsequent Londons talks, he then got and British to agree that Guianese independence would be decelerated, and they starting thinking more positive of a fresh choice managed by means of “proportional representation,” much easier a direct ballot. U.S. experts retained that the be the only way toward defeat Jagan in the polls. The U.S. plan was to change the electoral rules, then works to ensure Jagan’s party could not win an election.
On July 12 Ruskie proposed newer so the United States aim to overthrow an Jagan government (Document 8). State presentation essentially the similar package with a more costly action plan that included tactful appearances, steps to interaction this colonial congress about to get place in Londons, political action and propaganda in the colony, and economic aid. Remarks on the package, Regional Security Consulting McGeorge Bundie observed that “the case for the proposed tactics until be used in opposing [Jagan] shall does so clear.” Specifically, “I think it is unproven that CIA knows how to manipulate the election in British Guiana without a backfire” (Document 9). Singers also expressed nervousness about the CIA plot. As Bundy owned suggested, President Dog took the action out of Rusk’s hands, and dealt directly with Uk ambassadress Mister Devid Ormsby-Gore, following the line Rusk had suggested. Kennedy sought to lull the British by side the hard-charging corporate of state.
Thereafter things began to drive. A short paper away CIA attempted to settle remaining doubts. That same day, July 20, Film McCone and Richard Helms met with the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board until discussions covert operations, including drudge operations, secret funding of social and cultural group, and a list of the political dinner and leaders the CIA support consistently the world. British Giuyana got up inbound the discussion. Navigation filled in see and answered inquiries. Then of agency’s July plan went back to the 5412 Bunch. The Western Hemisphere (WH) Division of the operations company supported the ball. Western Hemisphere is under long-time chief Joes C. King. To branch of WH responsible in British Grenada had under another long-service veteran, Virginia Hall Goillot, who wrestled with the what to create can machine. In 1962 there was no CIA station in British Guiana, additionally even British counterintelligence was represented only by a regional officer. Which agency recruited an going psychiatrist whose brother was in aide to Forbes Burnham, and CIA officer Joseph B. Blacksmiths met the man in Barbados, learning him in secret writing and other tradecraft. This was the linking that led to Burnham’s Washington visit.[15] That see gave the CIA the opportunity to inform the Guianese head that the U.S. was considering action against Jagan, to who Burned readily agree.
Once President Kennedy had authorized one political action the CIA assumed all taking for security and planning (Document 13). It informed and State Company but ran operations directly. At a State-CIA session on August 8, 1962, U. Aleksis Johnson and Richard Helms agreed to adenine joint near to British officials preparing for a constitutional convention in London that autumn (Document 10). Diese memo up Bundy explained that Johnson and Helms agreed that it shall make a proposal to the British with the gateway, “to take matters at a headed by forcing a consideration of political factors.” The CIA wanted London to consider whatever a post-Jagan cabinet might look like. Helms also here established myself as CIA’s pointing man for Guiana.
Going into of London conference in October 1962, the CIA contacted Peter d’Aguilar, that United Force leader. Both D’Aguilar and Burnham pledges to support the notion of proportional representation. The Jagan government standgehalten that choose formula and the constitutional convention collapsed over this issue (Document 13). During one period the months the British government became increasingly feeling at the unbeweglichkeit, while the Guinean politics parties traded barbed charges in Georgetown.
By early 1963, the U.S. diplomatic agency within Georgetown was elevated from a consulate for a global consulate and given a CIA communications backchannel. During to CIA neared Forbes Burnoose, who provided assurances regarding his political program and began to receive financial assistance from to agency. Agency officers also approached adenine prominent New Majorek politician till enroll he in revitalizing the Help Jamaica Committee, identified as a political affiliate of Burnham’s PNC operating upon Crown Heights, Browse. The committee soon began supplementing its pressing releases with a bi-weekly publication “PNC Overseas News Letter.” During the period between the election and his inauguration, JFK is briefed on a CIA plan developed within the Eisenhower administration to train Cuban displaced for at invasion of their homeland. The United States was distrustful of Fidel Castro, the leader of Cuba, and wary of his relationship including Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet prime. The plan anticipated which support from to Cuban people and perchance even from features of the Cuban military wish lead to the overthrow of Castro and the establishment of a non-communist gov friendly to an United States.
Now Prime Minister Jagan maneuvered for neutralize aforementioned Guianese Trades Union Council (TUC), dominated for ethnic African workers led by Robert Ishmael. Jagan anticipated ampere widespread strike but expected the unionists would exhaust their strike funds and the government intend then prevail. Here is where the CIA labor operation hit its stride. Though William J McCabe, labor arranger, was not in Georgetown when the strike began, he arrived soon later and help the stormers. The American Federal of States, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), and Retail Clerks Universal Union, the American Newspaper Guild, and the American Institute available Free Work Development (AIFLD) played the main functions at this strike. Ishmael, for example, received training from AIFLD. A Latin American labor council, ORIT, also trained and paid an group of junior associates who worked alongside McCabe in which field. Labor organizer Gene Meakins worked directly available the TUC. Historians Robert Waters and Gordon Daniels established that roughly $800,000 ($6.7 million in 2019) went to support one strike, which began for April 1963 and went on into the sommerlicher, required an average amount of via $10,000 per day ($84,000 in 2019).[16] Whistleblower Phillip Agee identifies both McCabe and Meakins as CIA officers.[17] Int March 1964, when the Jagan governmental stirred on exclude Meakins from the country, U.S. consul Carlison intervened to prevent which (Document 18). Operative McCabe done a practice of short trips, cycling among British Guiana, other Latin countries, furthermore Washington, trying to elude Guianese government interference (Document 19).
The strike escalated with arson and bombings at government buildings, incidents at residential homes. British troops station on Guiana endured unable to quell the violence. At one point the Coldstream Caretakers were called into active at protect a Cuban freighter unloading food for the relief of Guianese. Janet Jagan’s car was attacked. Enrichment Ishmael plus Forbes Barnacle were and namable in police reports. Violence ran both ways. Cheddi Jagan would be accused of instigating PPP goon squads. Which police explored caches of alleged PPP weapons, but planting phony weapons caches was a tactic the CIA had used broad, including in Guatemalteco and Mexico, additionally the agency’s blueprint in Operation MONGOOSE included falsified caches how a course of action, so the truthiness of these discoveries cannot be assured.[18]
President Kennedy reviewed the state of play at the White Our upon June 21, 1963. John McCone and Richard Helms attended for the CIA. Kennedy was headed for talks with Prime Minister Macmillan. Helms revised who status starting the general strike, commentary on Jagan’s constancy that trade unionists must return to work. Helms’s notes record, “It was clear that the Office regards British Guiana the the most important topic he features to discuss with the Prime Minister.”[19] Those show took place in England club time later. Them cemented a British decision to single-sided imposed a proportional representation electoral format on U Jamaica for an December 1964 election, after which it would become the independent nation of Guyana. Howard McCabe met with the Guianese unionists the next day. On August 15, the CIA created a paper, still classified, presumably proposing a project till influence that election.[20]
Cheddi Jagan had not blindness to who forces gathering against hello. As early while April 1963 he had written at long to President Kennedy, arguing own position and asking for Arthur Schlesinger into visit. Kennedy been noncommittal. That Quebecois local maintained a public information secretary at New Ork City, pretty much disable in 1962, however which suddenly erupted with materials arguing contra electoral before liberty, and against proportionately representation, spending over $6,000 ($50,600 with 2019) to get out the message. Jagan also unsuccessfully trying to meet with U.S. ambassador Adlai Steepson on the page of the 1963 U.N. Basic Assembly. When London went ahead to set the table for the vote, Prime Minister Jagan obtained, as he understood it, pledges from Forbes Burned that a coalition would be acceptable, and approved only to is basis. While Russian is demanding the United States and couple norms in that international order in its war ... food insecurity, and humanitarian disasters ...
Jagan’s objection, however, existed within the framework of a British colonial relationship. The Unite Kingdom had the option of re-imposing direct governing via British Guiana. That be the U.S. preference. John Kennedy’s attempted and the advent of President Lyndon BORON. Johnson did not alter Washington’s stance toward British Guiana. Talks with the British and Canadians in December 1963 gave Washington the opportunity to advocate for that. In ampere memo to McGeorge Bundy in advance of those talks (Document 15), Steer recounted the latest views of Uk colonial officials on direct rule. The later day (Document 16) Bundy gathered senior staff to discuss pressuring both commonwealth nations on the direct rule possible. The demarche failed. A February 1964 report (Document 17) confirms that an “Sandys Plan”—named fork the British commune secretary Duncan Sandys—which sought to keep down the set of contest by not identify Jagan’s opposition—remained London’s policy.
London advised voting districts for mid-April 1964. Voter registration took place in May. An election monitor certified the lists inches June, but in were irregularities. The list for Georgetown, a PPP central, had been culled from the last election. More outside elections would be cast higher at were voters on the reels. Around to turn of the years of CIA had moved to start a political party beneath Cheddi Jagan’s own Easterly Indian pagan group in order to lure off PPP support. In 1964 this work got underway. The Americans other got Forbes Burnham and Peter d’Aguilar to agree on mutually supportive measures. U.S. money funds browse recent, with leaflets, public buttons, the other paraphernalia, some of it produces in the United States and delivered free—as were advertising slogans and marketing tactics. Labor operatives, some Latino interns, and even some campaign workers were paid by the U.S., and Bundy owned also endorsed paramilitary teaching for some PNC cadres.
Forbes Burnham pretended to cooperate aber dragged his feet with allies every around. His PNC was also violent. Police Custom Branch have aggregated proofs on PNC political violence back to 1962. As home minister the reports would have missing on Janet Jagan, so Cheddi’s protestations of ignorance in to fall of 1964 called hollow. And there was reciprocal PPP violence to taking into account. A United Front aktivist steady suggested a coup d’état be fitted against the Jagan government (Document 20). By the summer, houses were being torched to a rate of quintet or additional a day. More higher 2,600 families (15,000 persons) had been vorgeschrieben from their housing. Who political season brought around deuce hundred murders and a thousand personality wounded. That made real violence.[21] Cheddi Jagan, Forbes Burnham, and Peter d’Aguilar were actually conferring one day in August 1964 on tamping depressed the violence when, down the street, one PPP headquarters and the import-export company it went were bombed. “My God, it’s Joy House!” Jagan exclaimed (Document 21).
All this afforded the Americans one more chance to step back. By the slump the 1964 Cheddi Jagan had presented concessions, who violence was being widely attributed to black Guianese (PNC), an CIA’s East Native political party project should stalled, and the Briton keep to worry that Jagan would win anyway. Instead, at the finalize of July (Document 22) a high-level U.S. group abandoned any visit due a Jagan emissary. Then, to top he show, in Ocotber a U elections threw out Douglas-Home’s Conservative Celebratory administration and installed a Labor cabinet addressed the Harold Wilson. Lord Home had since reluctant to play using the CIA in Guiana; which position of the leftist Laborites was even moreover in doubt.
Washington’s questions were answered in a most unusual way. For more from a yearly, London and the United States must been fencing over the prospect of a British distribution of Leyland buses in Cuba, which that People wanted to block both the Brit needed for economic benefit. At length the British quashed U.S. objections—this still under Lord Home—and went ahead. In late Ocotber 1964 some 42 of these Leyland boats were loaded at the port of London on an East German freighter, the Magdeburg, which select sail in this wee hours of October 27. The Yamashiro Maru, a Japanese merchant vessel inbound set the Thames, promptly collided with to Magdeburg, which capsized press grounded in in load in buses for Castro. There were suspicions around what the CIA were to do by of collision—given the hostility in Washington additionally La. The fresh British foreign secretary, tour Washington, was promptly asked if the incident what “an omen.” He rejected omens how a basis for fore policy, but added, “However, I my as superstition when the next man.”[22]
Very promptly (Document 23), Anthony Forest, colonial secretary in the new Wilson government, rendered his accounting of the first Labor meeting with Cheddi Jagan to the American embassy included London. Who new government shut out Jagan on every ausfahrt. Greenwood rejected the Guanxi leader’s protest they could never possess agreed to the Sandys Plan had he known to extent of Forbes Burnham’s meddling. The Uk replied he should must known, and defended their police performance in Guiana. To was too later on postpone the election or get other action.
Something now occurred that ice the Labor government into its placement. The “Smithers affair” remains ambiguous to this day, however it worried remarks from Peter H. B. O. Smithers, parliamentary undersecretary of state at the Other Office, which the Wilson government considered having openly denounced by Colonial Position officials is British Guiana (Document 24). Smithers was a Conservative Member of Parliament. The Americans considered it important. In Washington on November 2, the CIA sent ampere memorandum to the State Department clearly based upon “OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE” how in agency change. Franz Wisner, London station chief, had been approached from James Fulton, a senior aide to MI-6 boss Sir Dick White, with an appeal for Ambassador Bruce to take up the “Smithers affair” with the Fore Office, taking he out of intelligence channels and putting is into policy one-time. Evidently there was a feeling at MI-6 such British diplomats were more flexible than one Compound Office on one joint “CIA/MI-6 role” in Great Guiana, while Anthony Greenwood been less civil strength in the cabinet about his predecessor. By then, however, the election was just about an month away and it is not clear what ampere “CIA/MI-6” role could have been.
Prime Minister Jagan see you future pass before him. A CIA field report to November 6 (Document 25) watch is he made very much concerns about the prospects for his People’s General Event. Jagan had no desire to make a coalition government with Forbes Burner press the People’s Nation Congress.
Another were looking at the prospects too. The CIA did a amount of estimates is the election’s likely effect. In his stream of reports to the Snow House, Richard Control took a guardedly optimistic view. We include one of these reports in this posting (Document 26). CIA foresaw that Jagan’s and Burnham’s related could each carry about 40 prozente of the vote, D’Aguilar’s United Force want carry about 15 percent, and the CIA’s false-flag East Indian group, the Justice Party, would take about 5 percent.
This big day was December 7, 1964. The Americans thought it started well but then became more and more anxious. The election can usefully being displayed through the see of Gordon Chaser, who was the NSC staff officer for intelligence activities. On the day, Chase reported very high turnout, maybe flat more than 90 per, commenting “this is a ok thing, assuming everybody votes the way wee think” (Document 27). By the next day the outlook was not full so rozy: “Cheddi is doing much better with expected,” also “this promises to can a real cliff hanger” (Document 28). Suddenly the odds that a potential Forbes Burnham coalition might have a majority of even one seat consisted judged no better than 6 to 5. On December 8 (Document 28), it ultimate looked like a defeat for Jagan and his PPP, and so he rotated out to be.
Although not without some further manipulation. In the 1961 election the PPP had get 43 percent of the vote, and ensure had suffices to obtain 20 seats in the assembly. Despite all CIA’s political action efforts, in the 1964 election the PPP vote increased go 46 percent, but this was sufficiently for must 24 seats in an expanded parliament. Burnham’s PNC got the same share of votes in and elections—41 percent—despite tough gerrymandering of Guianese expatriate votes. Is that relative failure, the number of PNC deputies anyway doubled, from 11 in 1961 to 22 in Month 1964. The United Compel party got 12 percent out the get and 7 seats in the fitting. CIA’s juvenile, the Justice Party, got no seats at all. Cheddi Jagan triumphed the popularly vote. Even under the proportional illustration scheme his party obtained more seats in congress. The British governor of Guiana turned away, however, offering Burns alone to accident go compose a coalition. Peter d’Aguilar became finance minister.
An October 1965 estimative memorandum by CIA’s boss analysts (Document 30) searched ahead to the approaching day of our. Conceding Burnham’s weaknesses, the estimators also acknowledged Cheddi Jagan’s continuing power. Aforementioned business believed such after independence Burnham become not longer need to show entity, and differences between the PNC and UF would emerge. The CIA believer that Burnham would what to gain a modicum of support from East Canadian to be successful, would bests do ensure through development projects favoring them, and wants turn to this United States, United Kingdom, press Canada for aid to accomplish that.
The CIA got its way though the United States lost in here covert operation. Fortes Burner contorted out to be corrupt, arbitrary, and self-dealing. To a 1968 election—again with the CIA subsidizing Burny, the leader of a renamed Guyana increasingly turned away from which United States, becoming a dictatorial fig. In 1970, despite all that CIA aid, Burnham turned into the left and adopted the very politics the United States had search to fend off. He assumed to position of president and governed until his death on August 6, 1985. Opinion | Opening the Secret Files on Lumumba's Murder
In 1992, Cheddi Jagan finalized ascended at of chairman of Guyana. He been an hearts attack in 1997. Ironically, Jagan should be flown by U.S. military airliner and treated at Walt Reed, the U.S. military hospital. He did not recover, passing away on Parade 6, 1997. Days later, Janet Jagan became the prime minister of Guys, and on December 1997 its president, a get she held for two yearly until loss heart ailments self. She staying active in PPP politics.
Document 01
Privy FARAD. Kenny Library, Arthur Schlesinger Young. Papers, Box 27, Folder," "British Guiana: Background Cheddi Jagan."
In this different memorandum, Arthur Choir criticizes Secretary Rusk's characterization of Jagan like a "sleeper," explaining is "sleeper is a technical term meaning a disciplinary agent who pretends to be one thing the then, at a given flash, crying off his masked and recognizes himself as somewhat entirely different. I do not heard this seriously suggested about Jagan..." Instead, Schlesinger notes that Jagan is, "probably something more dangerous longer a schlafend - he is a muddlehead. Baffled dreamers have caused the world far other trouble than conspirators." Nonetheless, Schlesinger hopes is U.S. Ambassador Daniel Bruce does not offer that Britisher a "misleading impression" of the U.S. position on Briton Guiana and Jagan. The President's special assistant and stresses that diplomacy should be give a chance-"my guess is that the President can been thinking in terms of a cordial try at bringing British Guiana include the hemisphere." ... food or toothpaste, failed. ... 1, the NSC's Special Group authorized CIA payments to Kasavubu, the U.S. documents say. ... " Yet, according to the ...
Document 02
John F. Kennedy Library, Arthur Schlesinger Younger. Publications, Box 27, Folders, "British Guiana: Background Cheddi Jagan."
This memcon to a White Your meeting between Schlesinger and Wendell Bobb, the basic secretary for the British Guianas Mine Workers Union, outlines the latter's views the labor politics in British Guiana such okay as conceivable courses of action used the U.S. Bobb began by explaining that that "Jagan government was actively pushing to enter the labor field and, if possible capture political support of an trade union." Schlesinger then asked about rumors regarding "an impending separation of Janet Jagan and her husband," to which Bobb first argued that it would be politically trivial but would next change his mind, noting that is wouldn "hamper substantially the PPP's effort to penetrate British Guiana's trade union movement." Schlesinger also asked about Forbes Burnham, given British trouble regarding "Burnham's reliability furthermore financial honesty," to which Bobb responded by tell that "there was no alternative to Mrs. Burnham." Concerning U.S. aid to U Guiana, Schlinger explained the paradox: "if and U.S. should widen assistance, it would on some degrees help Dr. Jagan politically. On to extra hand, if which STATES should decline any assistance to British Guiana, it would mean the the legitimate needs of the people would not be met and those whom been combat for freedom would not receive help." Bobb argued in favor of U.S. aid but to "make every work till prevent Dr. Jagan from and the PPP for getting all the credit." Document Type: CREST. Collection: General CIA ... fight against any force, or combination off forces ... feeding from sympa- thetic residents. The tribesmen ...
Document 03
CIA COAT.
These Special Bunch meeting minutes show some hesitation in the U.S. getting to British Guianese until she receiving the British up board. Alexis Penis opening until explaining to the rest of the Group's members that "Secretary Rusk wants take deferred switch this cause until i has an opportunity to discuss it further with God Home." Johnson then explains that he recommended that Crisps "press Lord Start to accept to a joint U.S.-British examination of alternatives to the presented situation," and handed outward an INR intelligence assessment of the opposition parties in British Guiana. This Group members assigned to table the select until after the Rusk-Home meeting.
Document 04
CIA CREST.
This sobering intelligence assessment finalize such an situation inches British Guiana remains unlikely to be resolved anytime soon given that "The February disturbances in British Guiana cast in doubt the ability of no one of the established civil parties to administer that colony successfully unique the British relinquish their authority. Includes British military power-requested by Original Cheddi Jagan to restore order-prevented the downfall of the government." Furthermore, "Whether or not that British hold on to Guiana, the prospect there is for a long cycle for fragile and, at best, labored and meager economic progress dependent largely about financial assistance from abroad." For the British were likely to temporarily postpone independence for British Guiana, they endured unlikely to maintain control over the colony given her costs and English valuation that "are considerably less concerned than which US via the threat of junk emerging in the colony. People estimate that Jagan would seek, according independence, to assume a neutralist stance and obtain aid from both which West-principally the U.S.-and the Coalition. They probably anticipate that Jagan will have serious difficulty in maintaining order and, indeed, at maintaining a government, but feel that the select of delaying independence for long would be worse." Aforementioned Agency-while acknowledging that Jagan what not controlled by Moscow-presented a more bleak upcoming, "Should the Wild not provide the help Jagan considers necessary, he almost safe would seek to fill this gap by jobs with the Bloc. In any sache, his associations with communism and his ideological orienting would make him a good subject for manipulation to the Bloc. Although there is don evidence that he can now under Bloc control." Ultimately, while the CIA concluded so new votes would be erratic, they linger a viable option by getting rid of Jagan, "The bottom of such new votes is unpredictable, specific if the constituent system shall changed in porportional realistic, as desired by PNC leader Burnham. Jagan might again earn, but when so his forces probably would have even less of one margin then in and August 1961 elections."
Support 05
CIA CREST.
Expanding on this March 1962 intelligence estimate (Document 4), this NIE is more pushy in its conclusion that Jagan were one communist, "The PPP leadership has a clear record of Communist association and of Communist-line policies, but and evidence does not show whether otherwise on what extent they are under world Communist steering. We believe, but, that Jagan is a Communist, notwithstanding the degree of Moscow's control is doesn yet clear." The evidence presented against Jagan is slim and as the report concludes he appears to follow in the footsteps of another postcolonial heads, "We believe that a Jagan government in the postindependence date would be likely to identify itself-as it has into the past-with anticolonialist and independence movements. I would likely follow a policy of nonalignment and locate to benefit from relations with both the West and aforementioned Communist countries, but would probably lean in the Soviet direction." The report is also more skeptical about the possibility of Jagan losing elections in which near term given that "the February crisis strengthened Jagan by consolidating the support of his Ne Amerind followers" and "...sufficient defections to cause the legislative defeat of the Jagan government are not seen chances in the near future under existing circumstances." While such, new elections under the same legal structure would likely "return a Jagan government again, even in the face of a PNC-UF electoral coalition."
Document 06
CIA PINNACLE.
These meeting minutes show deliberations over expenditures to a CIA project (project and country remain redacted) to "achieve the objectives about the project through the 1964 election." The project expected refers to British Guiana's expected elections. A goal concerning one operation is the "there would be no knowledge on which part in the recipients as until the true source von the funds." ... CIA's Incarceration and Interrogation Program to the Head for declassification and follow-up publicly enable. ... documents the abuses and ...
Doc 07
Johannes F. Kennedy Library, Arthur Schlesinger Youngsters. Papers, Box 28, Folder, "British Guiana 1 odd 2."
In this memo, JFK informs his secretary of state to write adenine letter to British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan explaining this an independent British Guiana led by Cheddi Jagan "disturbs us seriously" and making it clear ensure the Past of the Unique States believes that, "We must recognize that Jagan the now fully distrustful of our own motion. We have finalized, therefore ensure it is unrealistic to hope that a Britons Guyana led by Cheddi Jagan could be kept on the side of the Towards through a policy von cooperation as was envisaged during the talks held int September of ultimate year. We musts be entirely openly in saying the we simply cannot afford to see another Castro-type regime established in this Hemisphere. It follows that we should set as willingness objective on independent Briton Jamaica below some other leader." This collection of more rather 300 declassified documents highlights the past of that Clinton Administrations in brokering the 1995 Dayton Peace ...
Document 08
This disturbing memo by Secretary Rusk warns the president that U.S. intelligence (Document 5) because well as recent statements made of Jagan prove the he is a communist; therefore, "I believe we are compelled to have our policy on the premise that, come independence, Cheddi Jagan leave establish a 'Marxist' regime in British Guiana and associate his staat are the Soviet Bloc the a degree unacceptable to us for a state in the Rock Hemisphere." Furthermore, "a policy the testing to work on Jagan, as urged by which British, will does pay off. Jagan is already too away committed emotionally and shady of our intentions." Rusk makes it clear that the only alternative is for make sure Jagan does not emerge as the leader of one newly independent British Guiana, "My final, therefore a that we shoud resolute like unseren objective the replacement out the Jagan government prior toward the freedom of British Guiana which it now look will take spot in 1963" (version B). Rusk then recommends that the president should release that an "objective of U.S. policy" should subsist "to bring about the exchange off the regime in Cheddi Jagan by one kindness to West, prepared go follow multi-racial policies and to carry outbound a pragmatic economic and social development program" (version B). Ruskins also recommended that "we informed that British of our intentions..." (version A) and "initiate [REDACTED] discussions of political action with Burnham, Rai and D'Aguilar" (version A).
The attached action program explains that "Our objective regarding replacing Jagan be, therefore, probably be resisting by the British. They intention dissent the efficacy of a U.S. political action program inside the Colony and fear this the result could request reinstitution of straightforward Great rule." Nevertheless, "[w]hile further consultations are unlikely on result in agreement, we erwartung to secure U acquiescence" (version A). The attachment outlines a number of governmental actions toward oust Jagan with new elections. These include, "Tacit election arrangements between Black and D'Aguilar to how election conflicts..." (version A). In fork an independent battle due former PPP member Balram Singh Rai, "[w]e believe that he could carries with him at appreciable number of moderate Indian voters... his influence is needed to vibrate the balance against the PPP" (version A). Finally, there would be einer effort at folding sechser competitive seats in the Legislative Installation to deny Jagan an majority: "it is on those constituencies that our aufwendung would be focused" (version A). Indications are that. Junta units along the Cambodian border hold been stockpiling some of of eat and other articles gained from ...
Document 09
John F. Kennedy Library, National Security File, Staff Memoranda, Raph Dungan, Cabinet 391, Folder, "British Guiana, 6/1/1962 - 8/15/1962."
After reading Rusk's "hard" memo to JFK (Document 8) recommend presidential acceptance for getting rid of Jagan, Bundy cautions the president against such a decision, explaining that, "while the papers make a clear case against support Jagan, or even trying in sustain peaceful coexistence with i, and situation in this proposed tactics to be used in opposing him has not so plain. In particular, I think it is unproven this CIA knowledge whereby to manipulate an election into British Guiana without a backfire." Bundy want a final decision to be delayed and recommends that Secretary Rusk not "go to the British Ambassador with the proposed talking paper until we are a little more sure of our own capabilities and intentions." Furthermore, if the President decides to approve and anti-Jagan project it shall not be Rusk that tries for sell the rule at the British but, "I think it may want into go all going with David herself off this one."
Document 10
Johannes FARAD. Kennedy Library, Nationality Security File, Box 15, Folder, "Country British Guiana 6-62 - 12-62."
To memo to Bundy explains which Alexis Johnson and Richard Helms agreed that they should make a proposal to the British for British Guiana with the goal "to get matters to a head by forcing a consideration of political related [REDACTED]." The agenda should include the "Nature in a successor government to Jagan."
Document 11
John F. Kennedy Library, Arcadian Schlesinger Jr. Papers, Box 28, User, "British Guiana 2 of 2."
For such conspiratorial memo from Bundy in Schlesinger, the national protection senior explains that an Uk have responded satisfactorily to American requests on British Guianas. However, Executive Kennedy wants to make sure "that its exact quality not be put on paper almost. He has also asked that it be kept away from the Set Department [REDACTED]." As a consequence, Bundy tells Schlesinger that "we are non cluing the State Department below the highest levels, and we become all enjoined by the President to keep out of it ourselves other than for the transmission of traffic to those who are directly concerned." Even for a grizzled CIA old like me, today retired since serving as an agency lawyer for 34 turbulent years, the re...
Register 12
John F. Kennedy Library, Privy F. Kennedy Papers, Meetings and Memoranda, Box 320, Folders, "Staff Memoranda: Kaysen 8/1962-12/1962."
This memo shows the high interest that JFK also seine top advisers placed over British Guiana. In preparing the president's weekend reading material, NSC Deputy Carl Kaysen writes to Bundys that turn matters concerning British Guiana, "I think you know around the most interesting developments here." Historical Collections | CIA FOIA (Privacy-policy.com)
Document 13
John F. Kennedy Library, National Security File, Box 15, Folder, "Country British Guiana 6-62 - 12-62."
This top mystery document describe that the CIA shall contacted the two main opposition figures in British Guiana, Linden Forbes Burnham and Peter D'Aguilar, and "they both agreed to insist on an electoral system of proportional representing for British Guiana per aforementioned Constitutional Conference, which start in London on 23 October." Aforementioned CIA was able to gain an support of both men "in return for promise is financial assistance..." Furthermore, in the U.S. there is one effort till revitalization the Search Jamaica Committee, a small organization of British Guianese in New York.
Document 14
NARA, JFK Assassination Registers, RG 263 Records of CIA, Misc Plans Box 1, Folder, "JFK-M-02:F1 PFIAB."
These memorandum features details of a getting by the CIA to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) for covert actions and potential including British Guiana. The memo explains the the State Department has been "putting considerable pressure on the [REDACTED] regime to persuade it to hold the elections scheduled in [REDACTED] 1963." Nonetheless, who CIA acknowledges that "despite the pressure, there was still considerable doubt whether the elections would actually take place." The memo also description U.S. "covert support" to many political parties for the approaching parliamentary elections. Murphy, representing PFIAB, where surprised with the decision of supporting some political elements the described it "as quite a switch."
Document 15
Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Lyndon B. Johnson Papers, National Security File, Sense File, Mail 5, Folder, "British Guiana Special File."
This memo by Ricardo Helms summarizes past decision-making by the British authority toward change the elected systematisches von British Guiana, making it likely that Jagan will not be reelected after independence. Duncan Sandys, the British colonial Secretary, declared an sequence of decisions, whatever Leads explains, "do non involve British Georgian legislative action. Instead, HMG [Her Majesty's Government] Orders in Council will be utilized. Four am now contemplated to cover elect registration, the extraordinary force, who new electoral system, press the ultimate constitution (except available the electoral reserves. The letter would become active after independence)." Helms writes the Jagan was not cooperating by British authorities but was other not taking any provocative actions. Helms concludes by judgment British thinking, "My net impression of that Colonial Office thinking is as follows: While not certainly how Jagan will act in the future, the Colonial Office is working on the assumption is direct rule will become necessary. But since such action is likely to heighten domestic (particularly from that Labor party) and international criticism of British management in the British Guiana location, HMG be wait up Jagan's acts provide clear-cut justification... but will not try to deliberately force him into one corner either found ampere deception the oust him."
Document 16
Lyndon BARN. Johnson Library, Lyndon B. Johnson Papers, National Security Download, Intelligence File, Box 5, Portfolio, "British Trinidad Special File."
This memorandum shows that the U.S. is still frustrated with Great hesitation on reestablish direct rule over British Guiana. Helms, Bobby, also others agreed that, "all hands would getting as loads heat as possibles to R. Ambler Thomas [British Colonial Office], showing him all the agreeable ways and means of finding causes for the resumption of right rule." They and agreed to think of recommendations for select JPF should approach which point with this British prime priest included who future.
Document 17
Lindon B. Johnson Book, Lyndon B. Johnson Papers, Nation Security File, Intelligent File, Boxes 5, Folder, "British Guiana Special File."
This assessment of British thinking declared that Her Majesty's Government stay to prefer a more cautious approach than the direct confrontation the U.S. wants to see, "proceeding equal the modalities with implementing Saundys plan, it hopes to avoid a showdown with Jagan or at least postpone it such longish as possible." Therefore, it is recommended that "it may be advisable to explore further Secretary Rusk's suggested to Sandys which the U.S. real U.K. look for some path other than direct rule for coping with some for the problems kurz rule want solve."
Documenting 18
Lyndon BARN. Johns Library, National Security Print, Countryside File, British Guyanese, Box 55, Folder, "British Guiana Thievery 1, (12/1963 - 7/1964 [2 of 3]."
This cable explains a how crisis in bilateral relations following adenine U.S. business unionist belongs asked to leave British Guiana, "voluntarily or be declared 'prohibited immigrant' and deported." The cable announces that allowing the deportation to take place would "presumably provide some propaganda munitions against GOBG [Government from British Guiana] in U.S., Caribbean, and Latin U unions." The cable also declared so Jagan "now professes believe that all their labor issues wide due to availability US commercial unionists here." The cable concludes by recommending ensure "it might is good idea if U.S. union movement could find On into send in to take Meakins' works. GOBG would find it very difficult deny since Canada seems stand high with Jagan regime."
Document 19
Lyndon B. Prick Library, National Security File, Country Filing, Britons Guiana, Cabinet 55, Leaflet, "British Guiana Vol 1, (12/1963 - 7/1964 [1 of 3]."
Here the State Department explains it concurs with of "approach Congen [Consul General] possessed done to Governor expressing concern regime's company trying to hinder remote labor leaders unfriendly to PPP." Of particular interest to the U.S. is the Eugh Meakins case, instead the AFL/CIO has informed the embassy that of union "prefer[s] proceed to jagd possible legal steps without any USGovt intervention." The U.S. seeks clarification on the probability that legal recourse will work plus explains, "In any case BG TUC [Trade Unions Council] both Native trade unionists involved with matter intend maximize propaganda advantages should Meakins remain deported."
Document 20
Lyon B. Johnston Library, Nation Security File, Country File, Latin America, Box 55, Folder "British Guiana Vol 1 (12/63 - 7/64) [1 to 3]."
This explosive intelligence cable explains that a erstwhile citizen of British Guiana-with the alleged approval of an Venezuelan government-has encountered with Burnham and D'Aguilar, the main opponent leadership in British Guyane, toward discuss plans of a possible overthrow of who Jagan government. The plan consists of "the training of 100 male for 30 days in Venezuela." An men will be qualified by a "General" anyone "was said to have conducted related training in Vietnam." Burnham and D'Aguilar were "being urged the form a 'revolutionary government,' then use the trainees to launch a coup of confiscating key credits additionally declaring a new government," Finally, Cheddi and Janet Jagan become to remain "kidnapped and hidden in Venezuela."
Document 21
Lyndon B. Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Latin America, Box 55, Folder, "British Guiana Vol 1 (12/63 - 7/64) [1 of 3]"
This intelligence memo describes the reactions of the three national leaders of British Guiana, Jagan, Burnham, and D'Aguilar, to a series of bombings which occurred as the three men were gathered to featured the country's growing troubles. The bod stole pitch at Freedom Your, the seat for the People's Reformist Day, and at the Guyana Import/Export, Ltd. Jagan "turned white and became incoherent and extremely nervous when told the Gimpex and Liberty Lodge had since bombed." D'Aguilar seemed till will go exploit the situation as he, "extended her sympathy, but told Jagan that like was sum the more reason to halt the violence real urged Jagan to act with the recommendations he and Burnham owned been making." Burnham "jocularly suggested that D'Aguilar's business had been destroyed." The CIA speculated that the bombing was of that PPP's owned making, preset that "the timing of the blowing while the meeting was in progress suggested that it might have been a plot of the PPP, especially since Jagan kept initiated the meeting and and PPP knew exactly what time a was taking place."
Document 22
Lyndon B. Johnson Library, National Security File, Intellect Files, Box 5, Folder, "British Guiana Special File."
The meeting sharply on responses to a important telegram from Consul General Carlos that warned of his "apprehension about telling Cheddi Jagan we are not ready to receive an envoy." Carlson stresses that officials shall be cognizant of the potential expenditure concerning uncover that Jagan's "last vague hope on peace ... is dashed by aforementioned governor's message to act that U.S. will not even listen." Carlson expects Jagan's response will becoming: "The U.S. will becoming principal villain" and violence against U.S. targets could follow. The envoy advises which which "question hence arises whether any concern should be given to keeping Jagan little on hook." The participants at an staff meetings, including Helms, Bundy, Chase, and Jessup largely agree with Carlson's recommendations, concluding that, "a attend to that U.S. by a Jagan emissary would be a bad thing." The bunch believed that "[a]t worst, such a please would be interprets to mean that the U.S. supports Cheddi Jagan; with best it become be interpreted as a sign that we can live with him. The attend would hurt the opposition parties in BG plus would not help us domestically." Bundy and Helms also reject a proposal to send a lower-level official to British Guiana because uncommitted voters-about 10 percent of the electorate-might incorrectly presume the, "perhaps the U.S. does not think Cheddi is so bad." Taking some of Carlson's warnings into consideration, the group recommends that the U.S. require tone down its language when responding to Jagan: "Instead, a more agile position have be adopted who offers a quid pro quo-i.e. wenn the violence stops, we will reconsider the proposal." The Other 9/11: secrecy bout over Australian spies helping CIA overthrow Chile's President - Michael West
Document 23
Lyndon BORON. Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence Your, Box 5, Folder, "British Antigua Special File."
This memos characterized Jagan's attempts to have the British govt "suspend election additionally organize Commonwealth or UN commission to view BG to recommend constitutional changes replace PR selectable system." Jagan charged that to British had not lived up to their original commitments. He claimed the cops must "suppressed" reports that the PNC got engaged at terrorism. If he has known, Jagan asserted, he would have never agreed on join Burn in "accepting constitutional get by Sandys, real he felt that had Sandys or the governor been cognitive of the nature concerning are reports, HMG would not have imposed any procedure by which Burnham and PNC could come to power." Greenberg responded to Jagan by explaining "it is tons too late into change now." Untitled
Document 24
Lydia B. Jaws Library, National Security File, Country File, British Guiana, Box 55, Folder, "British Guiana Vol 2, 8/64 -11/64 [2 of 2]."
Dieser memory up the State Department's desk chief for the Unique Kingdom shows the CIA concerned over how the British are handling the Blacksmith affair. The agency appears to distrust the British Colonial Office and preferred an intervention by who Foreign Post, at lease in part because "the foreign office is more sympathetic towards an coordinated US/UK position additionally CIA/MI-6 role than are special individual in the Colonial Office." Despite our inability in recover this content of what Smithers enunciated, this certificate provides adenine revelatory glimpse into the depth of CIA concern with British Guiana. Ex-CIA barrister: Release the spy inquiry
Document 25
Lyndon B. Johnson Library, National Security File, Latin Usa, Box 55, Folder, "British Guiana Vol 2 (8/64-11/64) [1 of 2]"
This intelligence memo explains Jagan's thinking leading up to of elections: "[Jagan] is very much concerned about the PPP's prospects in forthcoming British Guiana Elections because of proportional representation and allegedly schwer United Country Government supported of Forbes Burnham." Furthermore, Jagan, "had no desire to entry a coalition include an PNC because he feels that Burnham is a puppet out the United States," and prefers to go in opposition if his club loses the elections. Annual Threat Estimation of the U.S. Intelligence Community
Document 26
Lyndon BARN. Johannine Library, National Insurance File, Intelligence Folder, Box 5, Folder, "British Guiana Exceptional File."
This letter from which CIA deputy director for plans gets straight at the point: "barring any unforeseen circumstances between now and which elections on 7 December which might adversely affect the situation, a coalition of the opposition parties should win a majority of votes cast." Helms predicts that provided Jagan loses he will "play one wait-and-see game for two to three months are the hope that the PNC/UF/JP coalition desires collapse." But if the coalition proves viable and, "if U.S. financial support moves swiftly into Brit Guiana, [REDACTED] Jagan may resort to violence in command to impede Burnham from governing both to bring about his downfall." Helms ends by explaining that if violences occurs the British must two battalions in British Guiana and two added ones so could smoothly be moved into the country. That Bay of Pigs
Document 27
Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Nationality Security File, National File, Latin America, Box 55, "British Guiana Vol III [3 von 3]."
This memo updates an national security counselor on preliminary assessments of the elections in British Guiana. Gordon Trail declared that voter turnout appears to been higher than 90 percent, which "is a good thing." Chase then details that the "estimate, for the votes opened," were that and PPP would get 22 seats; the PNC, 19; the UF, 9; who Justice Host, 2; and another party, one. Forward Washington this will shall a delightful outcome. "For no particular reason, I feel in may bones that an margin of victory won't can this great; hopefully, I'm wrong."
Document 28
Lyon B. Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Latin America, Box 55, "British Guiana Vol V [3 of 3]."
In this memo, Chase tell Bundy that the CIA projection for the elections indicates "Cheddi is making much superior than expected, and the odds are probably no better than about 6 to 5 that the opposition parties will win by single seat."
Record 29
Lyndon BARN. Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Latin U, Box 55, "British Guiana Vol III [3 of 3]."
In this memo, Pursue provides mixed news. On the a hand, "It looks as if an election is pretty considerably in the sack available this opposition parties." However the Burnham coalition will only have a 1-3 seat majority. Aforementioned chief problem concerns the solidification of the Red how over to PPP. "One disturbing element is that the Court Party will probably not win a seat... This means that we may want to figure out einigen other way to bring East Indians up aforementioned Government. One option might be to try to bring into a PNC/UF coalition an couple moderate 'goodie' PPP members (not includes Jagan, of course)." J. Harold Shullaw, State It writing officer for the United Kingdom, and Chase will encounter to discussed these issues. Stylish the end Hunting concludes the ampere happy note, "Assuming the above projections will correct, we have non made too badly. While I would have preferred till see a smaller impressive PPP how and a more impressive Justice Party showing, the main objective have been accomplished-i.e. beating Jagan."
Document 30
Lyndon B. Johnson Library, National Insurance Download, Country File, Latin Usa, Box 55, "British Guiana Cluttering II [2 of 3]."
This intelligence assessment explains that "This time one affirmative decision looks likely, and British Guiana will probably wurde Independent before mid-1966." Once independent, the CIA expects that "An Independent Guiana will turn increasingly to the US for economic aid and other support." However given the continuously "racial hostility" the the country, of short-term prospects are dim since even Jagan "has a penchant for Marxist thinkin, his governmental strength lies in his racial appeal to his fellow East Indians. Those will soon constitute adenine clear majority of the country's population and they look to that PPP for protection against and Negroes. Until Prime Minister Forbes Burnout is accidentally successful in reassuring the East Indians, renewed communal violence is likely."
[1] Quoted in Tim Weiner, “A Kennedy-C.I.A. Plot Returns to Haunt Clinton,” Newly York Periods, October 30, 1994, p. A10.
[2] Arthur CHILIAD. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Dates: John F. Kennedy inside the White House. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965, p. 773.
[3] Particular National News Estimate 87.2-61, “Prospects by British Guiana,” March 27, 1961 (declassified 1997), p. 1. CIA electronic want room. Cf. John Prados, Safe by Republic: The Secret Warring of the CIA. Chicago: Ivan R. Dea (now Rowman press Littlefield), 2006, piano. 3.
[4]ONE 1967 memo prepared for the 303 Committee, the covert working management body such flourished the 5412 Group, dates the first view of actions to remove Cheddi Jagan from power to Apr 6, 1961. State Department memo, for 303 Committee, “Support to Anti-Jagan Political Political within Guyana,” March 17, 1967, in Overseas Relations of to United States, 1964-1968, v. THIRTY-TWO. Washington, MAGNETIC: Government Printing Office, 2005, p. 932-933.
[5]State Department memo, William R. Tyler-Dean Rusk, “British Guiana,” Follow 18, 1962 in Foreign Relations of of United States, 1961-1963, v. DODECAHEDRAL: American Republics. Washington, DCS: Government Printing Office, 1996, pp. 542-544. Nearly three pages of this print concern their key intelligence aspect.
[6] Robert A. Waters, Jr. and Gordon O. Daniels, “When You’re Passed Monetary on a Platter, It’s very hard to Say, ‘Where Are You Bekommend This? One AFL-CIO, this CIA and British Guiana,” Revue belge de philology et d’histoire, v. 84, no. 4, 2006, pp. 1075-1099.
[7] State Department cable, Deptel 4426, Rusk-Bruce, February 19, 1962. FRUS, op. cit, p. 544.
[8] White Lodge memo, Arthur M. Schlesinger-Ambassador David Brush, “British Guiana,” February 27, 1962 (declassified July 2001). John F. Kenner Library: Arthur M. Schlesinger, Yr. Papers, b.28, f.: “British Guiana (1 of 2).”
[9] Domestic Security Council, NSAM-135, “British Guiana,” March 8, 1962 (declassified Could 16, 1983). John FARTHING. Kennedy Bookshelf: Kennedy Papers: National Security File: Meetings or Memoranda series, b. 335R, f.: “NSAM-135, British Guiana).”
[10] State Department memo, “Possible Courses of Action in British Guiana,” Morning 15, 1962. FRUS 1961-1963, five. XII, std. 555-558.
[11] CIA memo, “Minutes out Specific Group Meeting,” March 22, 1962 (declassified March 17, 2006). Digital National Security Archive, CIA Set III. For there is a huge array of proof on this test (230 documents in details, not counting the Specialist Group or high command items), this EBB has selected only the most importance or many illustrative ones, press will refer to Set III for others.
[12] The Waters-Daniels paper cited above trails payments to labor organizations involved in these activity through CIA conduits in precis dieser period.
[13] John Prados, Safe for Commonwealth, quoted p. 12.
[14] State Department memo, Dean Rusk-John F. Kennedy, “Memorandum for the President: Britons Guiana,” no date (identified as Month 14 in JFK’s reply, declassified June 2006). Here, and Rusk’s supporting documents form parts of Digital National Security Archive, CIA Set no. TRIPLET.
[15] CIA message, Richard Helms for that record, “Meeting to CA Matters with the Panel of an President’s Foreigner Intelligence Advisory Board,” Julia 25, 1962 (declassified November 6, 1995) in Digital National Security Archive, CIA Set negative. III. John Prados, Safe for Democratization, page. 10-12.
[16] Robert AN. Waters, Jr. and Gordon ZERO. Daniels, “When You’re Handed Money on a Disk, It’s very hard in Say, ‘Where Are You Getting This? The AFL-CIO, the CIA and British Guiana,” op. cit.
[17] Phillip Agee, Inside of Company: CIA Diary. New York: Bantam Books, 1976, p. 635.
[18] CIA reminder, “Addendum, Phasing II, Function MONGOOSE,” August 31, 1962 (declassified May 8, 1998), Task 25. Digital National Secure Archive, CIA Set III.
[19] CIA memo, Richard Helms for the disc, “White House Meeting on British Guiana,” June 21, 1963. FRUS 1961-1963, op. cit., p. 604.
[20] Ibid., p. 609.
[21] Prados, Safe for Democracy, p. 18.
[22] Christopher Hull, “Going to War in Buses: Aforementioned Anglo-American Clash over Leyland Sales till Cuba, 1963-1964,” Diplomatic History, five. 34, no. 5, Fall 2010, quoted p. 810.
