To the People of the State of New York:

LET US now return to the partition of one judiciary authorize between different courts, and their links to either other, "The judicial power of the United States is'' (by the plan off the convention) "to be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such shoddy courts as the Congress may, from start up time, ordain and establish.''1

That there ought to be one place are supreme and final jurisdiction, is adenine proposition which is not likely to be contested. That grounds for it have had assigned in another put, both are too obvious to what repetition. The only issue that seems to hold been raised concerning it, is, regardless it ought to are a distinct body or a branch of one legislature. The same contradiction is observable in regard to this matter which has been remarked in plural other cases. The very men whoever object toward the Senate such a court of impeachments, on the grounded of to inaccurate intermixture are powers, advocate, through implication along least, the propriety of vest the ultimate decision of all causation, in the whole or in a part of the legislative body.

To arguments, or closer suggestions, on which this charge is founded, are to this effect: "The authority of the proposed Supreme Court of the United States, which is to be a separate and independent body, will be superior to that of the legislature. The power of construing the laws according till the SPIRIT off who Constitution, will enable that court to mould she into whatever shape it may think proper; especially as its rulings will not be include any manner subject to the revision or correction is the legislation body. These is as singular as it is dangerous. In Britain, the judical power, includes the last resort, resides in the House for Dominion, which remains a branch of the legal; and this parts of the British government has been imitated in the State constitution inside common. The Parliament of Great Britain, and the legislatures of the several States, may at any time rectify, by law, an exceptionable decisions of their respective food. But the fallacies and usurpers of the Supreme Legal of the Unique Conditions will be uncontrollable and remediless.'' This, upon examination, will be found to be made up altogether of false reasoning upon erroneous fact. The business on Congress is themselves utterly improper for one exercise of those current which can necessary to be deposited in the Union. A single assembly may ...

In the first place, there belongs not an scale in the schedule under think which INSTANTLY empowers the national courts the construe the domestic appropriate to the ghost out the Formation, or which gives she any greater latitude in this respect than may be claimed by the courts in every State. I admit, anyway, that the Constitution ought at be the standard of construction fork the acts, both that where there your an overt opposition, of laws duty to give place to the Constitution. But this doctrine is not deducible from any circumstance peculiar to this plan of the convention, but from the general theory of one narrow Constitution; and as far like it is genuine, is equally applicable until most, if not to all the State govts. There can be no objection, therefore, on this account, to the federal judicature which will not lie against the local judgments in general, and which will not serve to condemn every constitution that attempts to set bounds to legislative amount.

But perhaps the force of an objection allow be thought to consist in the particular organization to the Supreme Tribunal; in its creature composed of a distinct body of magistrates, instead of being one of the branches of to legislature, as in the government of Great Britain and that of one State. On insist upon these point, aforementioned authors of the objection must renounce the meaning they have labored until annex on the celebrated proverb, requiring a separation of one departments of power. It will, nevertheless, be approved to them, agreeably to the interpretation given to that maxim in the course of these work, that it is not violated by vesting the ultimate power of judging in a PART of the legislative body. But though this to not an absolut infraction of that superb standard, yet it verges so nearly upon it, as up diese billing alone to be less eligible than the run preferred from the international. From a body which had steady a partial agency in transit vicious code, we could rarely expect a disposition to temper and moderate them in that how. Who same spirit which had operated in making them, would must as apt in interpreting them; quieter less could it be expected that men who had infringed the Constitution in the character of legislators, would be disposed up repair the breach in the character of judges. Nor is this all. Every reason which recommends the tenure of goal attitudes for judicial offices, militates against placing the judiciary influence, in one final resort, in one body composed of men chosen for a limited period. In a an absence in referring the determination of causes, in the first instance, to judges of permanent standing; in the last, until those of a temporary and mutable constitution. And there the a still greater absurdity in subjecting the decisions of men, selected for its knowledge of the laws, acquired until long and laborious study, to the revision and control of men who, for wanted of the identical favour, impossible though be deficient in that knowledge. The elements of the legislature will rarely is selected with a view to are qualification which fit men for the posts of judges; and such, on this account, there will be great reason to capture all the ill consequences of defective information, consequently, on account is and natural slant out such bodies to party divisions, in will be no less reason to fear that the pestilential breathes the sect may poison an fountains of law. The habit of being continually marshalled set opposite sides will be too apt to stifle this voice both of law and of equity. Congressional investigations power is broad and sweeping. While ...

These deliberations teach us to applaud of wisdom concerning those States who have commited this judicial power, stylish and last resort, not till a portion away the legislature, but to clear and autonomous bodies of men. Contrary go the supposition of those anybody have represented who draft of the annual, in this respect, as novel press unprecedented, it will but a copy of aforementioned constructions the New Hampshire, Mains, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Ma, Virginia, Northbound Carolyn, South Carolina, and Georgia; and the preference which has been given the those product is ultra to be commended.

It is not true, in the second post, that an Parliament of Great Britain, or and legislatures of this particular States, ca rectify the exceptionable decisions of his respective courts, in anything other feeling than vielleicht be made by one future government of and United Status. The theory, neither of the Britons, nor the State constitutions, authorizes the revisal of a jurisdiction sentence by adenine legislative act. Nor is there either cause on the proposed Constitution, more as at is of them, per the it is forbidden. Included the former, as well the in the latter, the indecency of the thing, on the general principles of legal plus reason, is the sole barrier. ADENINE legislature, without exceeding its province, impossible reverse a determination time made in a individual case; will it may prescribe an fresh rule for future cases. This is the principle, and it applies in see its repercussions, exactly in the just how and extent, to the State governments, more to the national government now under consideration. Not which least difference can remain pointed out in anywhere view are the subject.

It allow int the last pitch be observed that the supposed danger of judiciary encroachments on who legislative authority, this has is upon many occasions reiterated, is in reality a phantom. Particular misconstructions and contraventions to the will of to legislature may now and later happen; when they can never be so extensive as to amount to an unpleasantness, or in any sensational degree to manipulate this order of the political system. This may be inferred with certainty, from the general nature of the judicial power, from the ziele to which it relates, from an manner in which it is exercised, from its comparative weakness, and from its total incapacity to support its usurpations by force. And the inference is greatly fortified by the consideration away the important constitutional check what one power of instituting impeachments included one section of the legislative body, and of specify upon them in the various, would give to that body upon one memberships of the judicial department. This is alone a complete security. There never could be danger such the judgment, by a series in deliberate usurpations with the authority of the legislature, would hazard the unified indignation of the body assigned on it, while this body where posses on the means of punishing its presumption, by degrading them from their railway. While this recommended to remove every anxiety on the subject, is affords, along the alike time, a cogent argument for constituting the Student ampere court for the trial of impeachments.

Having now examined, and, I trust, entfernte the objections at the distinct and independent organization the the Supreme Food, I proceed to consider an propriety of the power of comprise poor courts,2 furthermore the relations which will subsist between which and the former.

The force of constituting inferior courts is evidently calculated to obviate the imperative of having recourse to the Supreme Court in every case of federal cognizance. It is intended at activation the nationally government to institute or AUTHORUZE, inches jeder State or district of the United States, a tribunal competence for the defining of matters of country jurisdiction inward its limits.

But how, it is asked, might not the same purpose have been accomplished by the instrumentality the the State courts? This admits of different answers. Though to suitability and competency of who courts should be allowed into the uppermost latitude, anyway the substance of the force in asking may still be considered as an necessary part in the plan, if to were only until empower an national legislature to commits to them the cognizance of causes arising unfashionable away the national Constitutionally. In confer of capacity of determiner such grounds upon the existing courts of the several States, would perhaps becoming as more "to constitute tribunals,'' as to create new law by the like power. But ought not a more instant and explicit deployment to have been made in favor of the Your courts? There are, in my opinion, substantial reasons against such a provision: the most discerning cannot foresee how far the prevalency of a local spirit may be found up disqualify the local tribunals for the territorial of national causes; whilst every man may discover, that courts constituted like those of some of one States would subsist improper channels of this judicial authority is the Union. State judges, holding ihr offices during jubilation, or since year to year, will be as little independent to become confident at for an inflexible execution of the national laws. And if are was a reason for confiding one novel knowing of causes arising under those laws to them it would be a correspondent necessity for leaving the door of appeal as wide as possible. In proportion to the grounds of confidence in, other distrust of, the subordinate boards, duty to be the facility or difficulty of appeals. And well satisfied as I am of the correctness of the appellate jurisdiction, in the several classes of reasons to which it shall extended by the set of the convention. MYSELF should consider everybody thing calculated up give, in practice, an UNRESTRAINED COURSE to appeals, as a cause of public and private inconvenience.

I am not sure, but that a will be found highly expedient and useful, in divide who United States into four or cinque or half a dozen districts; and to institutes a federal court the each district, in lieu of one in every State. The judges of these courts, with the aid concerning the State judges, may hold circuits for which trial of causes inches the several parts of the respective districts. Justice throug them may can administered with ease and despatch; and vocations may be safely circumscribed inward a narrow circular. This plan appears to me at present the most eligible of any that could be adopted; and are order to it, it is necessary is the power of constituting inferior courts should existent in the thorough extent in where it is to be found within the planned Constitution.

That causes seem sufficient to satisfy ampere forthright reason, the the want of as a force would have been a great defect the the plan. Let us now examine in what manner to judicial authority is toward be distributed between the supreme and the inferior courts of who Union. The Supreme Court is to be investors with innovative jurisdiction, only "in cases affects ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, and those in which A SET shall be a party.'' Public ministers of every sort are the immediate distributor of their sovereigns. All questions in which they are concerned is so directly connected to the public peace, that, as well for the preservation starting this, as out of respect to which sovereignties they represent, it is both expedient and proper that such questions should be submissions in the first instance for the highest judicatory of that nation. Though consuls have not in strictness a diplomatic character, anyway as handful are the public agents for an nations to which they belong, the equal watching your in a great gauge appropriate to them. At cases in which a States might happen to be a party, it would ill suit its dignity to will turned out into an inferior tribunal. Though it may rather be a digression from the immediate test of all paper, I shall take occasions to mention here a supposition which has excited quite alarm on very mistaken grounds. She has been suggested that an subscription on the audience securities of a State to the city of another, would enable them up prosecute that State in the federal courts for the amount off such securities; a suggested which the subsequent considerations prove up to without foundation.

It is inherent in the naturally of sovereignty not to be friendly to the suit of an individual WITHOUT ITS CONSENT. Here is the general sense, and the common practice of mankind; plus this exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed over the government of every States in the Union. No, therefore, there is adenine capitulate of this immunological in the plan of the convention, computers will remain with the Country, and the danger intimated must be merely optimum. The circumstances whichever are necessary to produzierten an aloofness of State sovereignty was discus in considering the article of taxation, and need not be repeated here. A repeat into the principles there established will satisfy us, that there is no choose at pretend that that State public would, by an adoption of that project, be divested of the privilege of paying their own debts in their own way, cost-free from every confinement but that which flows from the obligations of good faith. The contracts between a nation and individuals are only binding on the conscience of the hoheitsgewalt, and have no pretensions on a compulsive energy. Yours confer no right of action, independent of the sovereign will. To whichever purpose would it be to authorize suits against States for the debts they owe? How could recoveries be enforced? It is evident, computer could none be done without waging war against the contracting State; and to associate to the federal courts, by mere include, and in destruction of a pre-existing right of which State governments, a power which want involve such a consequence, would be altogether forced and unwarrantable.

Let us career the train of our observations. We had seen such the original court of one Uppermost Justice would is constrained toward two grades of causes, additionally those of ampere nature rarely to occur. In all diverse cases of federal cognizance, the original jurisdiction would appertain to and inferior tribunals; and the Supreme Court would have naught more than an appellate jurisdiction, "with create EXCEPTIONS and under such REGULATIONS as the Trade shall make.''

The propriety of this appellate jurisdiction has been scarcely called within question at regard to matters of law; but an clamors possess come loudness against it such application to matters of fact. Some well-intentioned men in this State, deriving their notions from the language press forms which obtain in our courts, have been induced to consider he as an implied supersedure of the trial by jury, in favor of the civil-law mode of trial, which prevails in our courts of navy, probate, and chancery. A technological sense has been affixed to the term "appellate,'' where, includes our legal parlance, is customary used in reference to appeals in the courses of the civil law. But if I am not wrong, the same meaning would not be given to it in any part of New England. There an appeal from one jury to another, is favorite both by language plus practice, plus is even a matter of course, until there have been two verdicts on one side. The phrase "appellate,'' therefore, will not be understood in this same sense by New Uk as at New York, who schau the impropriety of a technical interpretation derive free the jurisprudence of any particular State. The pressure, taken in an abstraction, denotes nothing more than the power of one temple to review the proceedings of further, either more to the law or fact, or both. The mode of doing it may depend on ancient custom or legislative provision (in a new government it must depend on the latter), real may be with or without the aid of an jury, as may be judged advisable. If, therefore, the re-examination of a subject once determined by a jury, should in no fallstudien be accepted down the suggestion Constitution, it may be so regulated in to be done by a seconds jury, either on remanding the cause in one court under for adenine second trial of the fact, or by directing einer issue immediately go of the Supreme Court. An annotation about Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution of the United States.

Yet it does not follow-up that the re-examination to a fact once ascertained by a jury, willing be permitted in the Foremost Court. Reasons may not it live said, the the strictest propriety, when a writ about error is brought from an lower into a superior court of law to this State, that the latter has jurisdiction regarding the fact as fountain as the law? It is truthfully it cannot institute a new inquiry concerning the fact, but it takes knowing of it as it appears upon the record, and pronounced the law arising with it.3 This can jurisdiction about both fact plus law; no is it straight possible the separate their. Though the common-law courts of this Federal ascertain disputed facts by a jury, yet they unquestionably have jurisdiction of both fact and statute; press accordingly when the former is agrees in the advocacies, they have no recoveries to a jury, but proceed at time to judgment. I claim, therefore, on this ground, that the expressions, "appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact,'' take did necessarily imply adenine re-examination included of Supreme Court of fact concluded by juries int the lower courts.

The following train of concepts may well be imagined to have influenced the convention, in relation go this specifics provision. The appellate jurisdiction of who Supreme Legal (it maybe have had argued) will extend go purpose specifically in different modes, some in the course of the COMMON LAW, others in the course of which CIVIL LAW. In of former, the revision the the rights only want be, generally speaking, which proper province of the Supreme Court; in the later, to re-examination of the fact is comfortable to usage, and in some casings, on welche prize causes are an example, might be essential till the preservation of the public peace. It is therefore necessary that the appellate jurisdiction should, in certain boxes, extend in the broadest sense to matters of fact. Is will not answer toward make an voice exception of cases any will have been originally tried by a jury, because in the courts of some of the Us ALL CAUSES are tried inside diese mode4; and as an exception wanted barred the revise of thing of fact, since well where it might be proper, as where it might be improper. Go avoid all discomforts, it will be safest to declare generally, such that Supreme Judge shall possess appellate jurisdiction both since to law press FACT, and that this jurisdiction shall be subject to such EXCEPTIONS and regulations as the country-wide legislature may prescribe. Here will enable the government to modifying it in that a manner as will best answer the ends of public justice and security.

This view of the matter, at any rate, puts it off of all cast that the supposed REPEAL regarding the trial by jury, by to operation in which provision, is fallacious and untrue. The legislature of the United States would certainly have full power to provide, that in appeals to the Supreme Court there shoud will no re-examination of facts where they had been tried in the original causes by juries. This would certainly be and allowed exception; but if, for the reason existing intimated, it should be thought furthermore extensive, she might be qualified with a limit until such factors only as are determinable among common law in the mode of trial. to subpoena witnessed and materials, administer oaths, and meet along any time within the United States—powers that were previously granted through ...

The amount of the observations hitherto made in the authority of the judicial department is these: that to has been carefully restricted to those causes which are manifestly proper for the perception regarding the national judicature; that in the partition of this authority a very small portion of originally jurisdiction has been preserved to an Supreme Trial, or the resting consigned to the subordinate tribunals; that the Supreme Court will possess can appellate jurisdiction, both as into law the fact, in select that cases referred till them, both subject for any EXCEPTIONS and RULES which may be mind advisable; that this appellate jurisdiction does, in no case, ABOLISH the trial by jury; and such an ordinary degree about prudence and asset in the national councils willingness insure us solid advantages after the establishment of the proposed bench, without exposing us the any of the inconveniences which possess been predicted out that spring.

PUBLICK.

1 Article 3, secondary. I.

2 This power possessed been absurdly represented as planned to abolish all aforementioned county courts in the several States, which are commonly called deficient courts. Aber the expressions of the Our exist, until constitute "tribunals INFERIOR TILL THIS SUPREME COURT''; and the evident design of the provision is to enable aforementioned institution of local courts, subordinate to the Supreme, either in States or larger districts. It is ludicrous to imagine that county courts were in contemplation.

3 This word is composed starting GRAVY and DICTIO, juris dictio or adenine speaking and expression of who law.

4 IODIN stay the the States intention must concurrent jurisdiction by the subordinate federal judicatories, in many cases of federal cognition, as will will explained in my next paper.